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All innovation is “downstream innovation” — research that builds on
prior discoveries. Patent law has an outsized influence on downstream
innovation because such innovation often falls within the scope of an inforce upstream patent. In these cases, innovators cannot conduct even the
most basic research towards downstream technologies without addressing
the upstream patent. Because upstream patents block downstream research,
and it is often impractical to license the upstream patent, downstream
researchers frequently exploit a group of doctrines that permit research to
proceed even in the presence of an otherwise blocking patent.
This Article presents the first systematic review of the paths to
downstream research. These paths — avenues by which downstream
research can proceed without permission of the upstream patentee — have
accumulated haphazardly over the years, often accidentally through legal
doctrines intended to apply to other situations. As a whole, they exert a
powerful influence on the direction of downstream innovation by exempting
certain projects, people, and institutions from patent infringement.
However, they do so in ways that are unplanned and not always beneficial.
Paths to downstream research therefore shift the course of scientific
development — for example, favoring foreign research over domestic
research, computer modelling over physical testing, and research on new
methods of using products over research on new methods of making
products.
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This Article makes two contributions to patent policy. First, it advocates
for fixing incentives for downstream research with a broad research
exception. Second, an array of policy efforts are founded on the assumption
that upstream patents block downstream research. By arguing that patents
do not block downstream research — they shift it — this Article re-sets the
baseline for these policies. Beyond policy, this Article provides new
theoretical perspectives on the interactions between patents and research,
which undergirds much scholarship on innovation in both law and
economics.
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INTRODUCTION
All innovation builds on previous discoveries.1 In acknowledgment
of the sequential nature of innovation, the patent system — designed to
incentivize innovation — explicitly encourages research that improves
on existing inventions, called “downstream” or “follow-on”
innovation.2 But the patent system also presents a fundamental
roadblock to downstream innovation: making or using a patented
technology is an act of infringement.3 Patents not only block
downstream technology from being sold, they block the research

1 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418-19 (2007) (“[I]nventions in most,
if not all, instances rely upon building blocks long since uncovered.”).
2 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 999 (1997).
3 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018).
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needed to conceive of and prototype downstream innovations.4 New
technologies can therefore only come about through three possibilities:
the innovator licenses the upstream patent (often not a viable
possibility), infringes the patent (discouraged by patent law), or
conducts acts that are not defined as patent infringement.
Prior scholarship has by-and-large ignored these paths outside patent
infringement.5 Yet they are of immense importance because they often
provide the only legitimate route by which downstream innovation can
occur. Their structure therefore deeply impacts the course of
downstream innovation. Here, I provide the first catalogue of these
paths and their effects. While existing case law and scholarship assumes
either that patents present a near-total block to downstream research6
or that downstream researchers proceed even if an upstream patent is
infringed,7 this Article emphasizes a third option: that much — perhaps
even most — downstream research falls into one or more carve-outs
from infringement.8
However, many of these paths are accidental, in the sense that the
doctrines were created to address other challenges and affect
downstream research only incidentally.9 Patent law therefore
unintentionally takes research projects that appear quite similar and
treats them in ways that are categorically different, rendering some
liable for patent infringement while exempting others completely. This
incentivizes research in areas that are exempt from patent infringement.
Thus, that limit the reach of patent infringement pull downstream
research along haphazard and arbitrary paths. For instance, the
structure of patent law favors foreign over domestic research,10
computer modelling over physical testing,11 research at state

4

See Madey v. Duke Univ. 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See infra Part II.B. A great deal has been written about the common law research
exception, but it effectively no longer exists in the United States, see Madey, 307 F.3d
at 1361, and is not among the exceptions discussed in this Article.
6 See Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab’ys, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). For further discussion, see infra Part I.B.1.
7 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853). For further discussion, see
infra Part I.B.2.
8 See infra Part II.A.
9 See infra Part III.A.1.
10 Foreign research is not affected by U.S. patents, advantaging foreign researchers.
See infra Part II.B.1.
11 Computer models of an invention are not infringement; physical creation is. See
infra Part II.B.2.
5
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universities over research at private universities,12 and research on
methods of use over research on methods of making.13
The following examples illustrate how patent law favors certain types
of downstream research. DuPont researchers created a pesticideresistant soybean that incorporated patented technology.14 The project
involved research only — DuPont never sold their plant. The research
infringed a U.S. patent, and a jury found DuPont liable for $1 billion.15
Had DuPont conducted its research outside of the United States, it
would not have been liable for infringement.16 Patent law incentivizes
foreign over domestic research, pushing companies to move research
abroad.
In another example, a researcher invented a device to detect security
flaws in patented Radio Frequency Identification (“RFID”) chips.17 He
bought patented RFID chips and then copied the chips, possibly an act
of patent infringement.18 The patentee threatened to sue the researcher
for infringement if he publicized his research.19 Had the researcher’s
device worked in an alternative manner — say, by disassembling,
modifying, or using the RFID chip — rather than by copying the chip,
he could have escaped liability under the first sale exception.20 Patentees
can block critical studies of their products if the criticism requires
making the product, but cannot block such studies if the criticism
involves using the product — an arbitrary result.21
The unintentional nature of these effects on downstream research
highlights a deeper ill in how patent law is conceptualized. Courts,
scholars, and policy makers take a bifurcated approach to law making,
focusing on the effects of a doctrine on either sales or research, but not
12 State universities cannot be sued for patent infringement under principles of
sovereign immunity. See infra Part II.A.3.
13 Experimentation on new uses of commercially available products is not patent
infringement under the first-sale exception. See infra Part II.A.1.
14 Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 748 F.3d 1189, 1192 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
15 See id. at 1195.
16 The patent was filed in the U.S. only. Note, however, that the case also involved
a question of contract law, which may have applied irrespective of location.
17 See Brenda M. Simon, Patent Cover-up, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1299, 1304-05 (2011).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 The first sale doctrine permits any use of a patented product as long as it has been
bought in an authorized purchase. The first sale doctrine does not allow the purchaser
to make additional copies of the patented product. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S.
278, 280 (2013).
21 For example, safety studies of drugs would be permitted but safety studies of
manufacturing processes would be blocked. See infra Part II.A.1.a.
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both.22 But patent law is unitary: doctrines apply to both sales and
research alike.23 This mean that when a doctrine is intended to affect
sales, its impact on research — which may be substantial — is often
overlooked.
This Article also clarifies several fuzzy assumptions that appear in
case law and literature on downstream innovation. One common
assumption is that patents block downstream research.24 As a matter of
legal doctrine, patents quite clearly do block downstream research —
any act of making or using the patented technology is infringement.25
However in practice, downstream research plainly occurs even when a
blocking patent exists. For example, 12,331 downstream patents were
filed on innovation relating to the drug Lipitor (atorvastatin) while the
drug was still protected by an upstream patent.26 This is partially
because many researchers ignore patents. But it also occurs because
much of the downstream research is not patent infringement at all. It is
therefore more accurate to say that patents shift the course of
downstream research, rather than block it entirely.
A second strand of case law and literature takes for granted that
downstream innovation occurs without permission of the upstream
patentee and models how upstream and downstream innovators split
the surplus from an existing downstream innovation.27 But there is a
gap in this literature. It assumes that downstream innovation occurs,
but it does not explain how it occurs.28 Given that patents at least facially
present a complete block to downstream research, this is not a small
omission. This Article shows paths by which downstream research
occurs. This adds richness to the literature on upstream/downstream
negotiations by clarifying when downstream innovators need ex ante
permission from the patentee before beginning research and when
negotiations can happen ex post after an invention has been developed.29
22

See infra Part III.A.3.
See id.
24 See Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab’ys, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). For further discussion, see infra Part I.B.1.
25 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018).
26 And only 670 of these patents were owned by Pfizer, the exclusive licensee of the
Lipitor patent. See Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 2009 WL 2843288 at *3 (D. Del. Aug. 13,
2009) (calling Pfizer the exclusive licensee). Searching Google Patents for patents with
the keyword “atorvastatin” with a priority date between July 21, 1987, and September
24, 2009 (the patent’s expiration date, adjusted to account for 1213 days of patent term
extension), yielded 12,331 hits, 670 of which were owned by Pfizer.
27 E.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853); see also infra Part I.B.2.
28 See O’Reilly, 56 U.S. 62 at 113.
29 See infra Part II.
23
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After addressing theoretical and doctrinal questions of downstream
research, the Article turns to reform. First, recognizing that many
doctrines accidentally create incentives for certain types of downstream
research means that these doctrines can be harnessed to deliberately
push downstream research towards desired outcomes. Alternatively,
some of the ills of the current system could be remedied with a broad
research exception that allows any research on a patented invention to
proceed without fear of liability.30
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I defines downstream
innovation, explains how it is both encouraged and deterred by patent
law, and summarizes the broad existing literature on downstream
innovation. Part II develops a taxonomy of doctrines that permit
downstream research without patent infringement, identifying both
effects of individual doctrines and patterns of effects. Part III explores
the problems with these doctrines in the aggregate and their
implications for scholarship and policy.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Incentives and Deterrents of Downstream Research
1.

Incentives for Downstream Research

In the patent context, the term “downstream innovation” (sometimes
more generally called “follow-on” innovation) refers to innovation that
falls within the scope of an existing patent.31 For example, if a patent
covers a particular process, downstream innovation includes projects to
improve the yield of the process or on outputs of the process.
Many celebrated inventions are the result of downstream innovation
— Thomas Edison’s lightbulb, for instance. Edison was sued for patent
infringement by the owners of an upstream patent that claimed
“incandescing conductor[s] of carbon made from a vegetable fibrous
material.”32 The patentees sold lamps made from carbonized paper and
wood carbon, but they worked poorly and were not a commercial
success.33 Edison, after much experimentation, determined that

30

See infra Part III.B.3.
See e.g., Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (discussing how the scope of a patent affects the balance between upstream and
downstream innovation).
32 Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465, 466 (1895).
33 See id. at 472.
31
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bamboo fibers worked particularly well as filaments in lightbulbs.34
Bamboo fibers are vegetable fibrous material, thus Edison’s invention
fell within the scope of the earlier patent (which the Supreme Court
ultimately found to be invalid).35
Another famous example is sofosbuvir (Sovaldi; Harvoni), the first
cure for hepatitis C. Idenix Pharmaceuticals discovered that a group of
compounds called ß-D-2’-methyl-ribofuranosyl nucleosides could treat
hepatitis C and patented use of the compounds for that purpose.36
Pharmasset Inc., another company investigating hepatitis C treatments,
learned of Idenix’s discovery37 and used that knowledge to develop their
own ß-D-2’-methyl-ribofuranosyl nucleoside, a compound they named
sofosbuvir.38 Though Idenix had discovered and patented the class of
compounds to which sofosbuvir belonged, Idenix had not synthesized
or specifically identified sofosbuvir itself.39
Idenix and Pharmasset’s work was enormously valuable.40 In later
litigation, a court explained that the medical breakthrough was a
combination “of Idenix’s groundbreaking discovery” with Pharmasset’s
“revolutionary refinement of that invention . . . without both parties’
contributions, humanity may well have been deprived of a cure for
HCV.”41
34

Id. at 473.
See id. at 476.
36 U.S. Patent No. 7,608,597 (issued Oct. 27, 2009). The patent was later invalidated
for lack of enablement. Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 1165
(Fed. Cir. 2019).
37 Pharmasset may have learned of this discovery through disclosure of confidential
information. Susan Decker, Caroline Chen & Christopher Yasiejko, Gilead’s Patent Loss
to Merck Started with a Broken Friendship, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 16, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-16/gilead-s-patent-loss-to-merckstarted-with-a-broken-friendship [https://perma.cc/6VQM-GPXQ].
38 Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 694, 699 (D. Del. 2017).
Note that sofosbuvir is a ß-D-2’-methyl-ribofuranosyl nucleoside under the court’s
construction of the term, but Pharmasset and Gilead dispute the construction. Id.
39 Id. at 703-04. The court emphasizes that Pharmasset’s discovery was built on
Idenix’s earlier work. Internal Pharmasset documents called the Pharmasset compound
an “Idenix derivative[].” Id. The court’s language makes it apparent that it considers
this a case of downstream innovation. In finding enhanced damages inappropriate, the
court discusses the challenges of balancing upstream and downstream innovation and
the need to calibrate the patent system to encourage downstream innovation. Id. (“The
Court—and, more generally, the patent system—wants to encourage, and not deter,
innovation on existing ideas . . . .”).
40 Andrew Pollack, Hepatitis C, a Silent Killer, Meets Its Match, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4,
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/health/hepatitis-c-a-silent-killer-meetsits-match.html [https://perma.cc/2DZF-YU69].
41 Idenix, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 704.
35
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The patent system recognizes the importance of downstream
innovation and explicitly incentivizes downstream research by granting
patents on “new and useful improvement[s]” of earlier inventions.42
This means that the downstream innovator can receive a patent on their
improved technology even when the upstream innovator also has a
patent on their earlier version of the technology. This was the case for
the discovery of sofosbuvir discussed above — Idenix held a broad
upstream patent covering a class of compounds that included
sofosbuvir; Pharmasset held a patent on sofosbuvir itself.43
The patent system also promotes downstream innovation by giving
downstream innovators leverage to negotiate with upstream patent
holders to extract value from the invention.44 In situations where an
upstream patent is in-force and a downstream innovator obtains their
own patent on an improved version of the technology, the upstream and
downstream patents are considered “blocking,” because neither
patentee can fully practice their invention without permission of the
other.45 The downstream patentee’s invention falls within the scope of
the upstream patent, thus practicing the invention is infringement.46 At
least part of the upstream patentee’s invention falls within the scope of
the downstream patent, thus, the upstream patentee may not practice
that portion of the invention without permission of the downstream
patentee.47 These mutual restrictions give both the upstream and

42

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
See Idenix, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 698-99. Pharmasset’s discovery was patentable
because it was not obvious from Idenix’s patent that sofosbuvir would be a useful
treatment for hepatitis C. Indeed, Pharmasset scientists went to some effort to ensure
that their development was eligible for its own patent. After learning about Idenix’s
patent, Pharmasset scientists “affirmatively reviewed Idenix’s patent . . . [,] determined
its compound of interest was not included in the closed list of potential compounds
described in the patent, then proceeded to make and test that compound — a compound
that Idenix itself was not able to make and test until after it reviewed Pharmasset’s
application.” Id. at 699. A Pharmasset executing advised scientists at the company to
“look for the holes” in upstream patents, “areas . . . that we might work on and still be
able to get an invention.” Id. at 700. Pharmasset scientists succeeded in finding a
compound that was novel and nonobvious even in light of Idenix’s discovery and
obtained their own patent on sofosbuvir. U.S. Patent No. 8,580,765 (issued Nov. 12,
2013).
44 See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research
and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 29, 30 (1991); Lemley, supra note 2, at 992.
45 Prima Tek II, LLC v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
46 See id.
47 See id.
43
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downstream innovators incentive to reach an agreement to
commercialize the fruits of the combined innovation.48
The availability of blocking patents reflects the value that patent law
places on downstream innovation.49 As put by the Supreme Court,
downstream innovation is “both necessary to invention itself and the
very lifeblood of a competitive economy”50 and patent law reflects a
careful balance between the need to promote innovation through patent
protection, and the importance of “facilitating . . . refinement through
imitation . . . .”51
2.

Deterrents to Downstream Research

Though the patent system values downstream innovation, it also
poses a colossal roadblock: the act of conducting downstream research
is an act of patent infringement. Patent infringement is defined as
making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing a patented
invention.52 Most downstream research requires conducting one of
those actions. For example, to discover a new use for Teflon, one would
have to conduct experiments using Teflon — an act of infringement.53
To discover a new way of making Teflon, one would have to make
Teflon — an act of infringement. To discover a new combination of
Teflon and other chemicals, one would have to use (and possibly make)
Teflon — an act of infringement. Patent infringement is a strict liability
offense, so downstream research by anyone and for any purpose at all is
an act of infringement.54
48 See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The
Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 80 (1994). To illustrate the concept of
blocking patents, consider the example of sofosbuvir. Both Idenix and Pharmasset
patented their inventions. The Idenix patent and the Pharmasset patent blocked each
other. Pharmasset could not sell sofosbuvir without Idenix’s permission. Similarly,
Idenix could not sell sofosbuvir without Pharmasset’s permission. Ultimately, Idenix’s
patent was found to be invalid, so Pharmasset can now sell sofosbuvir without Idenix’s
permission. Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 694, 699 (D. Del.
2017).
49 For a discussion of reasons patent law incentivizes downstream innovation, see
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Pierson, Peer Review, and Patent Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1825,
1834 (2016).
50 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
51 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 579 U.S. 93, 109 (2016).
52 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018).
53 The patent on Teflon covers any use of polymerized tetrafluoroethylene (Teflon).
U.S. Patent No. 2,230,654, claim 1 (issued Feb. 4, 1941).
54 A common misconception is that activities that do not generate a profit or that
do not involve selling a competing product — such as research — are not patent

2022]

Paths to Downstream Innovation

2219

Historically, this was not the case. The research exception, a judicially
created doctrine, exempted certain acts of research from patent
infringement.55 This permitted downstream researchers to conduct
experimentation on patented products in at least some circumstances,
although the precise contours of the doctrine were never well defined.56
However, by late 1900s the doctrine was disfavored57 and it was
essentially eliminated by the Federal Circuit’s decision in Madey v. Duke
in 2002.58
In theory, downstream research could be permitted by private
licensing: upstream patentees have an incentive to license downstream
research and split the resulting profits.59 But in practice this is not a
complete solution. Scholars agree that transaction costs are sufficiently
high that licensing will often not occur.60 Anecdotally, there are many
reports of instances where transaction costs have prevented a variety of
potentially fruitful licensing agreements for downstream research.61
Further, the process of negotiation is itself a deterrent. If the
downstream researcher discloses her idea to the patentee to begin
negotiation, the patentee can freely appropriate the researcher’s idea
without recompense, since the researcher has no intellectual property
infringement. For example, after academic scientists were named in a patent
infringement lawsuit, journalists recorded surprised reactions from the scientists:
“‘[patent infringement] is something we don’t think about,’ he said. Basic scientists who
use [patented compounds] ‘aren’t violating the patent for profit . . . so I can’t imagine
that they would have any liability.’”). Marcia Barinaga, Scientists Named in PCR Suit, 268
SCIENCE 1273, 1274 (1995). But patent law is a strict liability tort. In re Seagate Tech.,
LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
55 The doctrine was first expounded by Justice Story who wrote that “it could never
have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a
[patented] machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of
ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”).
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
56 See, e.g., Giese v. Pierce Chem. Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 33, 35 (D. Mass. 1998)
(finding academic scientists exempt from patent infringement under certain
circumstances).
57 See, e.g., Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(using a narrow application of the experimental use exception); Roche Prods., Inc. v.
Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ( “[T]he experimental use
exception [is] truly narrow . . . [and] broad construction is not justified.”); Deuterium
Corp. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 624, 634 (1990) (finding that the experimental use
exception does not apply to scientific inquiries with potential commercial applications).
58 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
59 See Scotchmer, supra note 44, at 32-35.
60 Id.; see also Lemley, supra note 2, at 990.
61 See Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry:
The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 832 (2001).
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protection over the idea.62 This problem, known as Arrow’s information
paradox, is a substantial impediment to licensing.63 In theory, the
downstream innovator can obtain a blocking patent to prevent this from
happening. But in practice, in order to get a patent (or indeed to be an
innovator) the downstream innovator must conduct some preliminary
experiments on the technology, which may well infringe the upstream
patent.
Even if transactions could be frictionless, patentees still do not have
an incentive to permit all socially beneficial research. Patentees will
block downstream research by competitors and by researchers who
might criticize the patented technology.64
B. (Mis)Understanding Downstream Research
There is abundant case law, scholarship, and policy work on
downstream innovation. However, this writing does not completely
describe the relationship between upstream patents and downstream
innovation. Broadly speaking, previous writing falls into one of two
camps, each de-emphasizing a different aspect of the relationship. The
first camp characterizes patents as blocks to downstream research and
does not discuss ways in which downstream research can occur despite
the presence of an upstream patent. The second camp assumes that
downstream research happens even when there is an upstream patent,
but it does not explain how downstream research happens, given that
much of that downstream research is patent infringement. The Sections
below summarizes the literature and caselaw and expands on the holes
in the current framing.
1.

Patents Block Downstream Research

The simple view of the relationship between patents and downstream
research is that patents block downstream research. This follows from
the formal structure of patent law — if any activity that falls within the
scope of a patent is infringement, then patentees can use their patent to
62 Unless she can get a patent of her own before negotiating. Merges, supra note 48,
at 89. Downstream researchers can only do so in certain circumstances, which is itself
a form of distortion. See discussion infra Part II.
63 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609,
615 (1962).
64 See Simon, supra note 17, at 1303; see also id. at 1303-14 (exploring how patent
infringement rules are used by patentees to cover up or hide problems with patented
technology).
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block downstream research. This assumption appears in a variety of
contexts. It has been espoused by the Supreme Court several times. In
Brenner v. Manson, the Supreme Court invalidated a patent after
worrying that it would “confer power to block off whole areas of
scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public.”65
In Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, the Court noted that patents could be
obtained “for the purpose of blocking the development of machines
which might be constructed by others.”66 In Lab Corp. v. Metabolite
Labs, the Court explained that exclusive rights can “forc[e] researchers
to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas.”67
Scholarly writing about the need for a research exception — a large
and prominent literature — also focuses on patents’ ability to block
downstream research.68 This writing emphasizes the blocking effects of
patents with little explicit attention to doctrinal mechanisms that permit

65 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966); see also In re ‘318 Pat. Infringement
Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534); In re
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534).
66 Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 374 (1945). The dissent elaborated, “It
is common practice to make an invention and to secure a patent to block off a
competitor’s progress . . . as to preclude experimentation which might result in further
invention by competitors.” Id. at 382-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
67 Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab’ys, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006).
68 See, e.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time
for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 458 (2004) [hereinafter
Protecting the Public Domain of Science] (discussing ways in which patents block
downstream innovation); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconsidering Experimental Use, 50
AKRON L. REV. 699, 712 (2017) (noting that the research community “must cope with a
system that sharply reduces incentives to innovate in an arena where the cost of getting
to market can be extremely high, yet the law does nothing to fix the research problem
created by the patents that do issue”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of
Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017, 1071 (1989)
(explaining that a system that requires “a license from the original discoverer” in order
for downstream research to proceed “is a less satisfactory means of promoting scientific
progress than free access to such discoveries,” which suggests that upstream patents
block free access to downstream discoveries); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine
of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1204 (2000) (arguing that “research,
if enjoined [as patent infringement], would frustrate further progress” of science);
Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent
Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 82-85 (2004) (explaining that patents can “slow technical
progress if the best follow-on inventors are prevented from building upon the inventive
idea during the patent term” and that patents “make it more difficult to build on the
inventions of others . . . . [E]ither because an improved invention still falls within the
claims of a prior patent . . . [or] because the research and development process for a
new invention requires the practice of a prior patent”).
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downstream innovators to evade those blocks.69 This emphasis is
appropriate given that scholarship on the research exception focuses on
the deterrent effects of patents, however, it leaves a gap: scholarship on
the effect of patents on research does not comprehensively discuss paths
by which patent law permits downstream research.
The assumption that patents block downstream research also appears
in the law and economics literature. The focus of this literature is on
how to best divide the patent incentive between upstream and
downstream innovators. Some of this literature operates from the
baseline assumption that downstream research in a patented area will
not happen unless the downstream researcher obtains a license.70 Thus,
broad patents have the potential to control downstream innovation71 or,
69 Some articles discuss one or two exceptions, but do not deal with them
comprehensively. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 36 (2001) (explaining that the
doctrine of patent exhaustion could be applied in such a way as to allow reverse
engineering of software); Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human
DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory
Licensing and a Fair-use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1691 (2001) (advocating for
a broader experimental use exception in order to “promote innovation by protecting
from infringement liability public-sector and nonprofit scientists engaged in
noncommercial research” but also mentioning that scientists at state universities are
protected by sovereign immunity); Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking
the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76
WASH. L. REV. 1, 33 (2001) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s narrowing of the
experimental use doctrine to categorically exclude commercial research but noting that
some noncommercial research is still permitted (though this may not be true after the
Federal Circuit’s 2002 decision in Madey)); Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use
Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS
L.J. 921, 925 (2006) (arguing that a broad research exemption is not necessary because
research can proceed through the Bolar exception expanded by the Supreme Court in
Merck v. Integra or through the doctrine of sovereign immunity); Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 223, 223 (2004) (explaining how firms can move research operations
abroad to circumvent US patents); Strandburg, supra note 68, at 118 (suggesting that
the exhaustion doctrine can serve as a research exemption) (“If the follow-on researcher
can obtain the necessary information by using a purchased product, which comes with
an implied license to use it, then there is no need for a special [research] exemption.”).
70 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 700 (1998) (explaining “[A
patentee can] leverage its proprietary position in upstream research tools into a broad
veto right over downstream research and product development.”).
71 See, e.g., Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78
VA. L. REV. 305, 307 (1992) (explaining that broad patents block opportunities for later
innovation) (“Consider the invention of Alexander Graham Bell’s telephone . . . .
[U]nder a grant of broad patent protection, Bell would control all opportunities for
developing new communication devices. . . . [N]o one would race to improve on Bell’s
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in the alternative view, to promote innovation by encouraging later
innovators to design around the patent and thereby come up with
creative alternative technologies.72
The emphasis on the block that patents pose to downstream
innovation is not wrong — patents do prevent certain downstream
activities. However, two complications arise. First, focusing on how
patents block research does not fit with facts on the ground: it is quite
clear that downstream research occurs even when patentees have not
permitted it, and some studies have found that downstream research
occurs equally frequently in the presence or absence of a blocking
patent.73 Second, it does not fit with the structure of patent law: patent
law is riddled with doctrines that permit downstream research in a wide
variety of circumstances.74 Because this literature focuses on ways in
which patent law blocks downstream research, it has given little
attention to the very important incentives created by the doctrines that
permit downstream research.
2.

Patents Do Not Block Downstream Research

A second line of case law, policy, and scholarly literature operates on
the premise that patents do not block downstream research. Here, the
assumption is that downstream research will occur and that, after
creating their innovation, downstream researchers will either negotiate
an ex post license or be mired in litigation with upstream patentees. In
this conception of downstream research, third parties conduct research
on patented inventions and can develop improved versions without

device. Instead, aspiring improvers would have to buy the right from Bell.”). Some
scholars view broad upstream patents as a beneficial mechanism to control downstream
research. See e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977) (“No one is likely to make significant investments
searching for ways to increase the commercial value of a patent unless he has made
previous arrangements with the owner of the patent. This puts the patent owner in a
position to coordinate the search for technological and market enhancement[s] . . . .”).
72 Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114
YALE L.J. 659, 686-87 (2004) (“Patents on upstream [technologies] . . . provide
additional incentives — legal and economic — to theorize outside of a dominant
paradigm. . . . [A] scientist is induced to develop alternate ways of conceptualizing and
investigating the subject of her research.”).
73 See, e.g., Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Follow-on
Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome, 109 AM. ECON. REV. 203, 227 (2019)
(“[W]e empirically find no evidence that patents induce economically meaningful
reductions in follow-on innovation . . . .”).
74 See infra Part II.
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permission from the patentee.75 The downstream research itself is not
blocked — it occurs notwithstanding the upstream patent — but the
improvement cannot be used or sold without permission of the
patentee.76
The Supreme Court has also endorsed this view of intra-patent
research, explaining that “some future inventor” might discover an
improvement to a patented process but “if it covered by this patent the
inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it without
the permission of the patentee.”77 This assumes that the future inventor
has already conducted their (presumably infringing) research and
developed their improvement but is then blocked from using the
invention.
This line of literature and case law accurately reflects that third parties
conduct research in patented areas. It also correctly describes that,
when downstream innovations enter the market and start to be sold, the
patentee can respond with a lawsuit for infringement.78 But this
literature does not provide a mechanism for downstream innovation —
75 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 178, 219-20 (1987) (“Perhaps the most important
function of early disclosure is to facilitate improvement of the patented invention
around the patent . . . . Since an insufficient disclosure makes the patent invalid and
unenforceable, those who have a use for the patented technology will be motivated to
uncover defects in the specification in order to avoid liability to the patentee.”); Kitch,
supra note 71, at 268-69 (“Subsequent inventors of superior automobiles will infringe
[a first patent on an automobile] . . . . Anyone else who makes a machine embodying
that process, even though much superior due to its improvements, will infringe that
claim.”); Lemley, supra note 2, at 991; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 909 (1990) (“[Broad patents]
created problems because other inventors such as Glen Curtiss, following close on the
heels of the Wrights, were blocked for a time from introducing their advances into the
fledgling industry.”); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property
Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 127 (1999) (“Although the followon improver can then secure a patent on that improvement, the improvement may
nonetheless infringe the original patent.”); Scotchmer, supra note 44, at 30 (“If broad
protection is granted, then a derivative or second generation product will likely infringe
the prior patent . . . .”).
76 Id.
77 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853).
78 See, e.g., Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 195 (2005)
(detailing a claim brought against a competing researcher for their use of a patented
pharmacologically useful peptide); Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co.,
159 U.S. 465, 471-72 (1895) (addressing infringement claim brought against competing
light manufacture for their marketing of a patented lamp); Idenix Pharms., LLC v.
Gilead Scis., 941 F. 3d 1149, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (finding that a patent for drug
treatment of the hepatitis C virus was invalid because it did not meet enablement
disclosure requirements).
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there is no adequate explanation for how the downstream invention
came to be.79 Some scholars assume that downstream inventions arise
through infringement or by accident,80 but ignore legitimate paths to
create downstream inventions without permission of the patentee. The
literature therefore misses the incentives created by these authorized
paths to downstream innovation.
II.

PATHS TO DOWNSTREAM INNOVATION

Downstream research presents a paradox: the research is conducted
on a patented product or process — yet making or using a patented
product is patent infringement, so why is there so much downstream
research that falls within the scope of an upstream patent? Some
downstream research is simply patent infringement and occurs when
the researcher either does not know about or does not care about the
upstream patent. But much downstream research is not patent
infringement. Rather, it arises from an activity that falls into one of the
many limits to and exceptions from patent infringement. Because a
downstream researcher who wishes to avoid infringement must proceed
through one of these limits or exceptions, these pathways serve to
channel downstream research in particular ways.
Below, I use the term “shift” to indicate when a doctrine moves
downstream in a certain direction. The baseline against which shifts are
seen is the states where researchers select projects without regard to the
potential for upstream patent infringement. Comparing the effect of
doctrines against this baseline highlights how doctrines have the
potential to affect incentives for downstream innovation. Note that the
term ‘shift’ does not imply either a positive or a negative incentive, but
merely denotes an influence.
The Section below catalogues some of the limits and exceptions that
shift incentives for downstream research. These are only a sample of the
79 For example, Merges and Nelson’s classic article on cumulative innovation
describes a significant number of downstream improvements involved in litigation, but
does not grapple with how those improvements came to exist in the first place. Merges
& Nelson, supra note 76, at 909. Some scholars have discussed mechanisms for
downstream innovation in particular industries or circumstances. See, e.g., Jorge L.
Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges,
2015 UTAH L. REV. 479, 492 (explaining how patentees license patents on “fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory” (“FRAND”) terms); Jorge L. Contreras, Much Ado
About Hold-up, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 877-78 (discussing innovation in the context
of industry standards such as Wi-Fi); Jacob S. Sherkow, The CRISPR Patent Landscape:
Past, Present, and Future, 1 CRISPR J. 5, 5-8 (2018) (exploring follow-on CRISPR
innovation).
80 See Scotchmer, supra note 44, at 30.
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limits and exceptions on infringement — almost every patent doctrine
creates some limit on the power of the patentee, so a full list cannot be
enumerated here. This Section explores how doctrines favor certain
downstream activities over others. As described further, the incentives
created by these doctrines do not channel downstream innovation in
thoughtful, deliberate directions. Rather, the incentives are often
accidental.
Table 1: Summarizing how patent doctrine shift downstream research
by treating certain activities as infringement while exempting others
Downstream research that is:
Not infringement (or not
Infringement
enforceable as infringement in
practice)
New methods of using an
existing product

New methods of making an
existing product

Research on commercially
available products

Research on non-commercially
available products

Late-stage life sciences research

Early-stage life sciences research

Research at state universities

Research at private universities

Research outside of the United
States

Research in the United States

Thinking about hypotheses

Testing hypotheses

Secret research

Public research

Low-cost research

Expensive research

Research in areas where patents
are voluntarily not enforced

Research in areas where patents
are voluntarily enforced

For each type of research listed in Table 1, the Section below explains
the doctrine underpinning the classification of the research as noninfringing and discusses the consequences of treating the research as
non-infringing while treating closely related research as infringing.
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A. Exception-Based Effects
Some shifts in incentives for downstream research arise from
doctrines that specifically define certain downstream activities as noninfringing.
1.

Making versus Using

a.

Doctrine

Patent law shifts incentives for downstream research by favoring
research on new uses for old technology over research on new methods
of making old technologies. This shift arises from the first sale doctrine,
also known as the exhaustion doctrine.81 The first authorized sale of a
patented product exhausts the patent right so that the purchaser is
subsequently free to use the product for any purpose.82 This releases
downstream researchers from the constraints of patent rights in certain
circumstances. A downstream researcher can buy a product from a
patentee — for example, a drug from a pharmaceutical company — and
conduct experiments on that product and those experiments would not
be patent infringement.
For example, Pfizer is the exclusive licensee of U.S. Patent No.
4,681,893, which, before expiration, had covered a class of chemical
compounds including Lipitor (atorvastatin), used to lower
cholesterol.83 The patent claimed the compounds without limitation,
thus, any use or creation of the compounds was patent infringement.84
Lipitor is sold commercially by Pfizer, therefore researchers can take
advantage of the first use exception to study the drug without fear of
patent infringement.85 Researchers can purchase Lipitor and conduct a
clinical trial to test whether the drug treats, for example, Alzheimer’s
disease — and it is not patent infringement.86 This exception is
particularly beneficial because it prevents Pfizer from blocking
81

Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1526 (2017).
See id. at 1527; see also Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617,
618 (2008); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 244 (1942).
83 U.S. Patent No. 4,681,893 (issued July 21, 1987). The patent is currently expired.
84 Claim 1 covers the genus of compounds itself.
85 See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
86 See, e.g., Cynthia M. Carlsson, Guofan Xu, Zhifei Wen, Jodi H. Barnet, Hanna M.
Blazel, Richard J. Chappell, James H. Stein, Sanjay Asthana, Mark A. Sager, David C.
Alsop, Howard A. Rowley, Sean B. Fain & Sterling C. Johnson, Effects of Atorvastatin on
Cerebral Blood Flow in Middle-Aged Adults at Risk for Alzheimer’s Disease: A Pilot Study,
9 CURRENT ALZHEIMER RSCH. 990, 990 (2012) (analyzing effects of atorvastatin (Lipitor)
on risk of Alzheimer’s Disease).
82
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researchers who are investigating aspects of Lipitor that Pfizer might
prefer not to study. For example, a trial comparing Lipitor with Crestor,
a competing drug, found that Lipitor was less effective — Pfizer could
not prevent this study (which was conducted by competitor
AstraZeneca, the manufacturer of Crestor) using its patents because use
of Lipitor fell into the first-use exception.87
b.

Shifting Incentives

The first sale exception shifts incentives for downstream research
because it exempts one type of research — experiments on
commercially available products — from patent infringement while
leaving other types of research as infringement. Researchers who buy
Lipitor and test new uses are not infringing. But other types of research
on Lipitor, if done before the patent expired, would have been
infringing.88 For example, experiments on new methods of synthesizing
Lipitor would have been patent infringement because in conducting the
syntheses researchers make Lipitor, an act of infringement.89 In
consequence, Pfizer had the power to block any research on new
methods of making Lipitor. New methods of synthesizing drugs lead to
more efficient and less expensive methods of manufacture and are
important components of reducing drug prices and improving access to
medicine.90
87 Lawrence A. Leiter, Robert S. Rosenson, Evan Stein, John P.D. Reckless, KarlLudwig Schulte, Margo Schleman, Paul Miller, Michael Palmer & Froukje Sosef,
Efficacy and Safety of Rosuvastatin 40 mg Versus Atorvastatin 80 mg in High-Risk Patients
with Hypercholesterolemia: Results of the POLARIS Study, 194 ATHEROSCLEROSIS e154,
e159-61 (2007). It is possible that this study also falls into the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
research exception, although post-marketing studies such as this are not always covered
by that exception. See, e.g., Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Zoll Med. Corp., 656 Fed. App’x.
504, 519 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that testing intended to “generate marketing
materials and on products already on sale — thus not for the purpose of receiving
approval from the [FDA]” was not protected).
88 Or would have been before the patent expired. Depending on the study, the
researchers may be purchasing the drug Lipitor, or they may be purchasing just the
active ingredient, atorvastatin. Either purchase would be protected under the first-sale
doctrine as long as it was authorized.
89 Many scientists are interested in new methods of synthesizing Lipitor. See, e.g.,
Sandeep Goyal, Bhautikkumar Patel, Ratnesh Sharma, Mangilal Chouhan, Kapil Kumar,
Mukesh Gangar & Vipin A. Nair, An Efficient Strategy for the Synthesis of Syn 1,3-diols
via Iterative Acetate Aldol Reactions and Synthesis of Atorvastatin Lactone, 56
TETRAHEDRON LETTERS 5409, 5409 (2015) (note that the authors are based in India and
research done in India would not infringe the U.S. patent).
90 This is illustrated by the fight over methods of producing erythropoietin (EPO).
See Andrew Pollack, Amgen Wins Initial Battle in Legal War Over Patent, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
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The first sale exception preferences research on using over research
on making. This preference is arbitrary — both types of research are
important and there is no empirical evidence (nor any theoretical
arguments) that the former is more important than the latter. Yet they
are treated quite differently by patent law.
The first sale doctrine also shifts incentives for downstream research
in other ways. It encourages research on commercially available
patented products by exempting their use from patent infringement.
Commercially available products can (by definition) be bought
commercially, and therefore are subject to the first sale doctrine. By
contrast, research on non-commercially available patented products is
infringement because the product cannot be bought but must be made
by researchers in order to be used in experiments, which is an act of
infringement. The patent on Lipitor, for example, covers thousands of
variations on the core molecule, most of which are not available
commercially.91 Researchers can freely conduct experiments on the
Lipitor molecule itself, but not on molecules that are slight variations,
even though both molecules are covered by the same patent. If a
researcher wanted to test whether a modified version of the compound
— for instance replacing the fluorine atom with a chlorine atom92 —
would more effectively reduce cholesterol, the researcher would
infringe the patent.
This shift towards commercially available products and away from
non-commercially available products also means that there are some
patented technologies that researchers cannot investigate at all. Some
patents, like the Lipitor patent, have a commercially available
embodiment. Other patents do not — meaning that no aspect of the
patented invention is available to the public. The first sale exception
allows research on Lipitor but does not allow research on similar patents
where the patentee does not sell a product.
Perhaps there are reasons for distinguishing between research on
commercially available and unavailable products — law may, for
example, value the patentee’s autonomy in choosing not to make its
product available for research. Conversely, law may want to incentivize
research on non-commercially available products because the public
knows less about these inventions and there may be more benefit to
research thereupon.
27, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/27/business/amgen-wins-initial-battlein-legal-war-over-patent.html [https://perma.cc/9D27-72WX].
91 U.S. Patent No. 4,681,893 (issued July 21, 1987).
92 A molecule with this substitution would fall into the patent claim, which
specifically covers a chlorine substitution. Id. at col. 2 l. 15-30.
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Empirically, it is not clear whether patent doctrine should
preferentially incentivize downstream research on commercially
available inventions, non-commercially available inventions, or treat
both equally. Yet patent law as it is currently applied makes a clear
choice to favor of research on commercially available inventions —
without a clear rationale for doing so.
2.

Late-Stage vs Early-Stage Research

a.

Doctrine

Much late-stage life sciences research is exempt from patent
infringement under an exception set out in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (also
called the section 271(e)(1) exception, statutory research exception,
and Bolar exception).93 Under this exception, an act that would
otherwise be infringing is not considered infringement if it is done
“solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission
of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.”94 This exception
was enacted as part of the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, which also
created an abbreviated pathway for generic drug approval.95 Generic
companies are permitted to enter the market immediately after the
relevant brand name patent expired.96 However, generic companies
have to submit test results to the FDA in order to get approval to enter
the market — and the act of conducting this testing was an act of patent
infringement.97 As a result, in practice generic companies could not
begin testing until the brand name patent expired, and could therefore
not enter the market until sometime later — effectively extending the
term of the brand name company’s exclusivity.98 Congress enacted the
section 271(e)(1) research exemption in order to avoid the lag in
generic entry.99 Under section 271(e)(1), it is not patent infringement
to test and manufacture generic drugs in preparation to submit an
application for FDA approval.100
93

35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2018).
Id.
95 Erika Lietzan, The History and Political Economy of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 53, 55 (2018).
96 Id. at 84.
97 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
98 See Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act:
History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 604 (2003).
99 Lietzan, supra note 95, at 55.
100 Id. at 102-03.
94
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The plain language of the statute does not limit section 271(e)(1) to
generic drugs, and over time the exception was expanded to other
applications.101 In 2005, the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of the
exception in Merck v. Integra.102 The exception in section 271(e)(1) is
not limited to the development of generic drugs, nor to preparation of
submissions to the FDA.103 It includes “all uses of patented compounds
‘reasonably related’ to the process of developing information for
submission under any federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or
distribution of drugs.”104
b.

Shifting Incentives

The practical effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Merck is that
a great deal of applied life sciences research is exempted from patent
infringement. The section 271(e)(1) exception covers preclinical
studies, including tests of drugs that are never submitted for regulatory
approval or that generate information that is left out of regulatory
submissions.105 Generic drugs can enter the market earlier because
testing the drugs is no longer patent infringement. Researchers on new
drugs neither have to worry about patent infringement nor pay for a
license for their research.106 For example, in Merck v. Integra, Integra
held a patent on proteins with a particular amino acid sequence of use
in binding to the outside of cells.107 Merck conducted research on how
several proteins containing this sequence could be used to inhibit
101 See, e.g., David J. Bloch, If It’s Regulated Like a Duck… Uncertainties in
Implementing the Patent Exceptions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 111, 121-22 (1999) (discussing expansion of
infringement protections to include devices and FDA-approved products); Courtenay
C. Brinckerhoff, Can the Safe Harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) Shelter Pioneer Drug
Manufacturers?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 643, 648-54 (1998) (noting the expansion of
protections to apply to “the collateral use of clinical data developed for submission to
FDA” for medical implant devices); Samuel M. Kais, A Survey of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
as Interpreted by the Courts: The Infringement Exemption Created by the 1984 Patent Term
Restoration Act, 13 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 575, 579-83 (1997) (noting that the
demonstration or display of an accused product will not constitute an infringing use).
102 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 195 (2005).
103 Id. at 206.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 208. As long as there is a “reasonable basis for believing that a patented
compound may work . . . to produce a particular physiological effect, and . . . if
successful, would be appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA.” Id. at 207.
106 There are possible exceptions for patents on research tools, however. See, e.g.,
Allele Biotechnology & Pharms., Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 20-CV-01958-H-AGS, 2021
WL 1749903, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 4, 2021).
107 Merck, 545 U.S. at 197.
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angiogenesis (growth of blood vessels) with potential applications in
treating a variety of diseases including cancer and arthritis.108 The
Supreme Court suggested that the plaintiff’s research could fall into the
section 271(e)(1) exception (and thus not be considered patent
infringement).109 The district court had originally found Merck liable
for over $6 million in damages for infringement — but under the new
interpretation of the exception, Merck’s research was lawful.
However, there are also vast swaths of research not covered by the
section 271(e)(1) exception, and this shifts incentives for downstream
research. The exception does not cover “[b]asic scientific research . . .
performed without intent to develop a particular drug.”110 It does not
cover research on techniques that do not need FDA approval, for
example trials of changes to nutrition or exercise routines.111 It does not
exempt research in fields where regulatory approval is not required.112
There are reports that companies choose projects specifically in
response to the incentives provided by section 271(e)(1). Lawyers
advising scientists on applying the exception recommended that
companies screening multiple compounds “should have a clear
understanding of the biological properties and physiological action of
those compounds prior to testing” in order to make it plausible that the
experiments were aimed toward ultimate FDA submission.113 But
companies that follow this advice may avoid screening less wellcharacterized compounds, possibly preventing drug discovery.
The section 271(e)(1) exception effectively serves as a tax on research
that falls outside the bounds of the statute because this research must
pay for a license to upstream patents whereas applied life sciences
research does not. Applied life sciences research is undoubtedly an
extremely important area of innovation, yet many other areas of
innovation are also important. Why are they treated differently?

108

Id.
The case was remanded for further consideration. Id. at 208.
110 Id. at 205-06 (“Basic scientific research on a particular compound, performed
without the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief that the compound
will cause the sort of physiological effect the researcher intends to induce, is surely not
‘reasonably related to the development and submission of information’ to the FDA.”).
111 The exception is limited to use of patented techniques for the generation of
information “under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs
or veterinary biological products.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2018).
112 Id.
113 Alicia A. Russo & Jason Johnson, Research Use Exemptions to Patent Infringement
for Drug Discovery and Development in the United States, 5 COLD SPRING HARBOR PERSP. IN
MEDICINE 1, 10 (2015).
109
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Under principles of sovereign immunity, states are not liable for
patent infringement.114 The effect of this doctrine is that state
universities cannot be sued for infringement.115 Researchers at state
universities can therefore conduct downstream research without fear of
patent infringement.
b.

Shifting Incentives

This may benefit downstream research — many positive discoveries
arise from state university researchers, and immunity from patent
lawsuits may encourage this work. However, even if sovereign
immunity aids downstream research at state universities, it also impacts
the progress of downstream research as a whole. While state researchers
can infringe freely, researchers at private non-profit institutions cannot
do so.116 This effectively favors researchers at public institutions over
researchers at private institutions.
Yet much valuable research is developed at both public and private
universities.117 There are excellent researchers at both types of
institutions. The doctrine takes researchers of similar skill and aptitude
and positions them very differently with respect to patent incentives.
To be sure, one can think of rationales for favoring public
universities. For instance, it may be desirable for the government to
subsidize research at public institutions because they focus their
research on issues of particular importance to their home state. But the
doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to patents was not created

114 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
630 (1999).
115 Compare Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional
Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 953, 953 (2000) (condemning the “Court’s Eleventh Amendment and sovereign
immunity case law”), with Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property,
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1161, 1170 (2000) (arguing against critics of sovereign immunity in
the context of intellectual property), and Ann Woolhandler, Old Property, New Property,
and Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 919, 920 (2000) (same).
116 See supra notes 114–115.
117 For instance, CRISPR was developed at both UC Berkeley (a public university)
and the Broad Institute (an institute affiliated with MIT and Harvard, both private
universities). See, e.g., Samantha Zyontz, Making the Cut: The Rate and Direction of
CRISPR Innovation 28-29 (May 3, 2019) (Ph.D. dissertation, MIT),
https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/123571 [https://perma.cc/2SKQ-244C].
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with these arguments in mind118 and the effects of treating state
institutions differently from private universities with respect to patent
infringement is an open empirical question.
Similar questions arise when comparing the effect of the doctrine on
public universities versus private companies. Researchers at private
companies must pay for licenses to upstream patents.119 Perhaps these
researchers are better able to pay for licenses to conduct downstream
research, so there could be a basis for holding them liable for patent
infringement while exempting researchers at public universities.
However, there may be circumstances in which private companies
cannot obtain a license from the upstream patentee even when they try,
meaning they must either abandon the downstream research or infringe
and pay a penalty — when researchers at state universities could have
continued the same project.
The penalties for falling on the wrong side of the immunity divide can
be large.
In Embrex Inc. v. Service Eng’g Corp., the plaintiff held a patent on a
method of injecting vaccines into a particular part of an egg.120 The
defendant conducted experiments to determine if it could create a
similar effect by injecting vaccines into a different part of an egg, a
technique that would not be covered by the patent.121 The vaccine
leaked into the portion of the egg named in the plaintiff’s patent,
unintentionally making the experiment patent infringement.122 The
defendant was liable; damages were $2,873,000.123 If the experiment
had been done at a state university, damages would have been $0. The
differential treatment caused by the doctrine is substantial — it may
discount research conducted at state universities by several million
dollars.
B. Non-Exception Based Doctrines
Some shifts in incentives for downstream innovation are not specific
carve-outs from patent infringement but are instead a function of how

118 The seminal case on the topic does not mention downstream research at all. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 627.
119 If the exceptions described herein do not apply to them.
120 Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1347.
123 Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 6, Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d
1343 (2000), 1999 WL 33630790 (Fed. Cir. 1999), at 6.
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patent scope is defined, limits on government powers, and limits on
patent enforcement.
1.

Geographic

a.

Doctrine

Patents exclude others from making or using an invention in only one
jurisdiction.124 A United States patent will, therefore, provide rights
only in the United States.125 Researchers outside the United States can
freely conduct activities that would be infringement if they occurred
inside the United States.126 Patentees often file patents in multiple
jurisdictions, providing wider coverage, but the basic principle remains
the same: patent protection is bounded by a geographic area. Further,
many countries broadly exempt research activities from patent
infringement, while the United States does not.127 As a result,
downstream research on a technology patented in the United States can
occur outside the United States but is banned inside the United States.128
b.

Shifting Incentives

The geographic limitations of patent enforcement shift incentives for
downstream research by favoring foreign research over domestic
research. If domestic researchers (other than the patentee) are barred
from working on improvements to a particular technology while
researchers elsewhere can freely conduct their research, foreign
scientists have an advantage in developing second generation versions
of the technology. Such rules also incentivize local companies to move

124 For instance, the United States defines patent infringement as “without authority
mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing] any patented invention, within the
United States . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
125 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007) (“[N]o infringement
occurs when a patented product is made and sold in another country.”).
126 E.g., John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 685, 694 (2002).
127 The World Intellectual Property Association compiles information on research
exceptions in its member countries. World Intell. Prop. Org., Standing Committee on the
Law of Patents, Reference Document on Research Exceptions, Doc. SCP/29/3 (Nov. 26. 2018),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_29/scp_29_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/96F9TXFV].
128 See Gregory Day & Steven Udick, Patent Law and the Emigration of Innovation, 94
WASH. L. REV. 119, 135 (2019) (“Since technology is generally developed in one
country, the innovation process exposes the typical inventor to infringement claims
only in that country.”).
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research units abroad, which would allow a domestic company to
circumvent patent laws.129 This incentive may run counter to efforts to
encourage domestic research.
The penalty for conducting research in the United States, instead of
abroad, is considerable. For example, DuPont scientists created a
glyphosate-resistant seed that, a court later found, infringed on a patent
owned by Monsanto.130 The research project took place in the United
States and infringed a United States patent.131 The patent was not filed
in any other countries. DuPont was liable for $1 billion for its infringing
research (the penalty was for research only — DuPont never sold its
seeds).132 If DuPont had conducted the research in another country, it
would not have been patent infringement, and damages would have
been $0.133
As with the other doctrines discussed, there are good reasons to limit
the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law. For instance, it may violate
accepted principles of territorial sovereignty and, as a practical matter,
not be possible to enforce U.S. patents abroad. But despite sound
rationales for the doctrine, it does treat U.S. researchers differently from
their international counterparts, possibly with the effect of pushing
research abroad.
2.

Constructive Reduction to Practice

a.

Doctrine

Patent law also shifts incentives through rules for granting patents on
downstream research. Downstream inventors can obtain patents on
their discoveries as long as they have made nonobvious improvements
over the upstream research.134 However, the downstream invention
must also meet all other requirements of patentability. One that poses a
particular problem for downstream inventions is the requirement that
the inventor reduce the invention to practice and have sufficient
information about the invention to teach others how to make and use

129 Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can Affect
Domestic Protections, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 224 (2004).
130 Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 748 F.3d 1189, 1192 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
131 U.S. Patent No. RE39,247 (granted Aug. 22, 2006).
132 Monsanto, 748 F.3d at 1192.
133 Breach of contract may still have been an issue in the case. Monsanto, 748 F.3d at
1195.
134 Merges, supra note 48, at 75.
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it.135 This may be a challenge for downstream inventors because
experiments are often necessary to discover an invention and develop it
sufficiently for patenting; but when an upstream patent is in force, such
experiments are patent infringement.
Patent law provides a path around this problem by allowing
downstream inventors to get a patent without conducting physical
experiments — patenting through a path called constructive reduction
to practice.136 Under the doctrine of constructive reduction to practice,
inventors do not have to physically create or test their invention (which
could be an act of patent infringement); instead, they can prove
patentability by describing how their invention would be created and
used.137 Since merely thinking and writing about a technology is not an
act of patent infringement,138 constructive reduction to practice allows
downstream inventors innovating within an area covered by an
upstream patent to obtain their own patent without committing an act
of infringement.
b.

Shifting Incentives

The doctrine of constructive reduction to practice creates specific
incentives for downstream innovation by rewarding researchers who
conduct thought experiments or computer modelling to generate
hypotheses but punishing researchers who conduct physical
experiments to test those hypotheses. Researchers who conduct only
thought experiments can obtain patents on their hypotheses, which are
valuable to provide leverage in negotiating with upstream patentees for
permission to conduct further downstream research.139 Patent law
therefore pushes researchers to get downstream patents before
conducting physical experiments. This is likely a counterproductive
exercise because many thought experiments will be wrong, and
therefore many of the patents will be granted to inventors who cannot
make the claimed technology — yet as granted patents, they will stand

135 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Stephen Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
136 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352; Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
1998); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
137 E.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352.
138 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1072 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“Classen’s view of its claim appears to have been that [the patents] covered
‘thinking’ about their subject matter. That is, of course, incorrect.”).
139 Lemley, supra note 2, at 990.
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in the way of further downstream researchers who want to work in the
field.140
3.

Secret Research

a.

Doctrine

Secret research is incentivized over public research. Both types of
research are equally infringing as a matter of patent law. But in practice,
research that can be conducted in secret or with a minimal audience is
less likely to be the subject of a patent infringement lawsuit because the
patentee will not discover the infringing behavior — a necessary
predicate for the lawsuit.141 Upstream patents may therefore not pose a
practical impediment to secret downstream research.
b.

Shifting Incentives

This shifts incentives for downstream research because the same
research, if done in public, would be patent infringement.142 As a result,
some types of research are systematically deterred by this aspect of
patent law. Such research includes work by academics, since
publication is the researchers’ goal, and development of technology that
requires certain types of regulatory approval, since the approval process
may involve some public disclosure.143 Conversely, research on
processes that occur outside of public view or products that are placed
on the inside of machines are favored by this aspect of patent law.
Yet both research with public aspects and research that can be done
entirely privately could be socially valuable, so why does patent law
effectively discourage the former? Indeed, the patent system deeply
values public disclosure: one of the main purposes of patents is to force
disclosure of inventions that would otherwise remain secret.144 It is
140 Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 53 UC DAVIS L. REV. 663, 691 (2019) (explaining
that predicted results are less likely to be accurate and thus that inventions
constructively reduced to practice are less likely to work).
141 See Joseph M. Barich, Pre-Issuance Publication of Pending Patent Applications: Not
So Secret Anymore, 2001 J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 415, 419 (explaining that patent rights
cannot be enforced if the patent owner is unaware of the infringement).
142 See J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 918, 955 (2011)
(discussing distorting effects of trade secrecy).
143 For example, when drugs are approved, they must be accompanied by a label
with extensive information about the drug including its ingredients. 21 C.F.R. § 201.10
(2021).
144 Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989); Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“In return for the right of exclusion
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disquieting that the patent system expends much effort to ensure that
upstream inventions are publicly disclosed (in the form of patents
themselves) but may have the effect of discouraging public disclosure
of downstream research. The structure of patent law may either
disincentivize downstream research that must be made public or deter
downstream researchers from publicizing details of their work that
could identify infringement, for instance, the specific machine used to
conduct a test or the results of negative tests.145 Both effects create
problems, the former because valuable research may not be done and
the latter because obfuscation of this sort is known to contribute to
replicability problems.146
C. Private Choices
Some shifts in incentives for downstream research are not imbedded
in patent doctrine, but instead arise from private choices around how
and when patentees enforce their patents. There are many factors that
go into those choices, which this Section broadly divides into private
choices to enforce patents on case-by-case bases and private choices to
enforce patents in more general patterns.

. . . the patent laws impose upon the inventor a requirement of disclosure.”); United
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933); see also Jeanne C. Fromer,
Dynamic Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1716 (2016); Timothy R. Holbrook,
Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 784 (2011); Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 532, 550 (2012);
Jason Rantanen, Patent Law’s Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 370
(2013).
145 For instance, the patentee in one lawsuit looked at the brand of PCR (polymerase
chain reaction) technology disclosed by academics in their publications and used this
information to prove infringement. Marcia Barinaga, Scientists Named in PCR Suit, 268
SCI. 1273, 1274 (1995) (“Roche scanned the literature for publications that mentioned
PCR, searched the materials and methods section for the source of the Taq polymerase,
and listed authors who named Promega as their source of Taq.”). Note that the
academics in this case were the direct patent infringers but they were not defendants in
the lawsuit, which was filed against an indirect infringer. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v.
Promega Corp., C-93-1748 VRW, 1999 WL 1797330 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1999).
146 E.g., Monya Baker, Is There a Reproducibility Crisis?, 553 NATURE 452, 452
(2016); Janet Freilich, The Replicability Crisis in Patent Law, 95 IND. L.J. 431, 439
(2020); Marcus R. Munafo, Brian A. Nosek, Dorothy V. M. Bishop, Katherine S. Button,
Christopher D. Chambers, Nathalie Percie du Sert, Uri Simonsohn, Eric-Jan
Wagenmakers, Jennifer J. Ware & John P. A. Ioannidis, A Manifesto for Reproducible
Science, 1 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 21, 21 (2017).

University of California, Davis

2240
1.

Choices to Enforce in Individual Cases

a.

Doctrine

[Vol. 55:2209

Patentees are likely to sue infringers conducting high-cost
downstream research and unlikely to sue infringers conducting lowcost downstream research. Patentees can seek an injunction or damages,
the latter consisting of either reasonable royalties or lost profits.147
Lawsuits are expensive, so patentees will only bring suit if the remedy
is greater than the cost of litigation — either situations where the
patentee greatly values enjoining the infringing work or situations
where damages will be high. There is often little value in enjoining a
research project because a patentee may not find out about the research
project until it is finished and published and further, patentees may
decline to sue academic infringers because of the reputational costs of
such a suit. With respect to damages, research projects that are small in
scope will often generate only small damage awards.148
But there are certain scenarios where patentees will sue. Enjoining
research may be valuable, for example, when research is conducted by
competitors or if research has the potential to criticize the patentee’s
work. For damages, while many infringing research projects would
generate small damages, other research projects are worth litigating —
for example, the cases described above where DuPont’s liability was $1
billion; Merck’s was $6 million, and Service Engineering Corp.’s was $2
million.149
b.

Shifting Incentives

These incentives to litigate shift incentives for downstream research
by making some research projects de facto non-infringing in the sense
that, while the projects are legally infringement, it is highly unlikely
147 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018); eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 390
(2006). This is in contrast to copyright, where statutory damages are available. 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c) (2018).
148 Damages in a case where the infringement was research, rather than sales, can be
determined by calculating a reasonable royalty, meaning the price that the infringer
would have paid the patentee to license the patent had they reached an agreement to do
so before the infringement occurred. See 35 U.S.C. § 284; see also Integra Lifesciences
I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, No. 96-CV-1307-B(AJB), 2004 WL 2284001 at *12 (S.D. Cal.
Sept. 7, 2004) (“After finding patent infringement, a jury may award the patentee
‘damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less that a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.’” (quoting 35
U.S.C. § 284)).
149 See supra Parts II.A.1–3.
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that a suit will ever be brought.150 Downstream research that is low-cost
to the upstream patentee (either in dollar terms or for reputational
reasons) may be incentivized, while high-cost research may be deterred.
One effect of this dynamic may be to deter criticism of a patented
technology. Patentees have used patent laws to muzzle critics.151 For
instance, a security researcher found flaws in certain RFID chips and
planned to present his results at a conference.152 The manufacturer of
the RFID chips — who also held a patent on the technology —
threatened to sue the researcher for patent infringement if he
presented.153 The researcher modified his presentation and no suit was
filed154 so it is not clear precisely what part of the research was allegedly
patent infringement, but the research involved cloning the RFID chip,
which might constitute “making” a new chip and could, depending on
the claims of the patent, be patent infringement. The structure of patent
law incentivizes patentee-friendly projects, and disincentivizes others.
Differential enforcement creates a second set of incentives. If
patentees rarely enforce their patents against downstream research
because most research is low-cost to the patentee (which is likely the
case), lack of enforcement may create a situation where researchers who
are comfortable committing an act that they know violates patent law
but where enforcement is unlikely will freely infringe. Researchers who
attempt to follow patent law will thus be disadvantaged. Low likelihood
of enforcement in the research context means that patent law
advantages researchers who do not care about infringement while
deterring their more cautious counterparts.155 Further, such a situation
benefits those who are ignorant about patents and infringement while
punishing researchers who attempt to learn about upstream patents.156
150

See supra Part II.C.1.a.
See Simon, supra note 17, at 1300.
152 Id. at 1305; see also Jennifer Granick, Patently Bad Move Gags Critics, WIRED (Feb. 28,
2007), https://www.wired.com/2007/02/patently-bad-move-gags-critics/ [https://perma.cc/
2D7N-9P4S]; Paul F. Roberts, Lawsuits, Patent Claims Silence Talk, INFOWORLD (Feb. 27,
2007), https://www.infoworld.com/article/2659928/lawsuits—patent-claims-silence-blackhat-talk.html [https://perma.cc/D8LL-SZ3M].
153 Simon, supra note 151, at 1305.
154 Id.
155 This argument has something of a parallel in scholarship on the morality of
efficient breach in contract law. E.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY
OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 17 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1981); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent
Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 277 (1986); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient
Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1989); Avery Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient
Breach, 45 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 777, 779 (2012).
156 This is a problem in patent law in other situations. Enhanced patent damages are
available in certain circumstances where the infringer had actual knowledge of the
151
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Patentees may publicly pledge not to enforce their patents, creating
incentives for downstream research in areas covered by those patents.
There are a number of high-profile examples of these pledges not to
enforce: many patentees have pledged not to enforce patents on
technology related to COVID-19,157 Tesla promised not to enforce its
patents against anyone using its technology in good faith for an activity
relating to electric vehicles.158 Toyota and Ford followed suit.159 These
pledges incentivize research on the companies’ technology by
promising a field free of patent infringement. Some patentees even
specify that non-enforcement is intended to promote downstream
research, for instance, Myriad Genetics promised not to use its patents
to “impede non-commercial, academic research.”160
Pledges are not the only example of how private parties can affect the
course of downstream research: parties may release their inventions into
the public domain or simply make the choice not to patent their
discovery, leaving it free for all.161

infringed patent, which is thought to discourage scientists from reading patents, in
order to avoid actual knowledge. Dmitry Karshtedt, Enhancing Patent Damages, 51 UC
DAVIS L. REV. 1427, 1469 (2018); Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent
Prosecution, 21 Harv. J.L. & TECH. 179, 213 (2007); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Halo v.
Pulse and the Increased Risks of Reading Patents, STAN. L. SCH. BLOGS (June 16, 2016),
https://law.stanford.edu/2016/06/16/halo-v-pulse-and-the-increased-risks-of-readingpatents/ [https://perma.cc/XT64-5WH2]. However, empirical work suggests that many
researchers nonetheless read patents. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?,
35 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 421, 422 (2017).
157 About
Us, OPEN COVID PLEDGE (2020), http://opencovidpledge.org
[https://perma.cc/2V9U-9U49].
158 Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You, TESLA (June 12, 2014),
https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you [https://perma.cc/9TBX-CXC2].
159 Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 544 (2015).
160 The Myriad Pledge, MYRIAD GENETICS, http://myriad.com/myriad-cares-2/themyriad-pledge [https://perma.cc/4YUV-B8VE].
161 One example is the patent on insulin. Its inventors sold the patent rights to a
public university for $1, saying, “Insulin belongs to the world, not to me.” David Beran,
Stephen Colagiuri, Nathalie Ernoult, Margaret Ewen, Cynthia Fleury, Molly Lepeska,
Pauline Londeix, Elizabeth Pfiester, John S. Yudkin & Stéphane Besançon, Failing to
Address Access to Insulin in Its Centenary Year Would Be a Catastrophic Moral Failure, 9
LANCET DIABETES ENDOCRINOLOGY 194, 195 (2021).
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Shifting Incentives

Patentees are, of course, entirely free to make choices about
enforcement. These choices very deliberately incentivize downstream
research in the area covered by the patent; they are designed to shift the
path of downstream research by attracting researchers to that space. In
this way, private parties can — like the public doctrines mentioned
above — create rules that affect the course of downstream research.
D. Second Level Shifts in Incentives
The Sections above have been dedicated to identifying individual
doctrines that shift incentives for downstream research. From these
individual doctrines, broader patterns emerge, which I term second
level shifts.
1.

Exemptions from Uncertainty

It is almost impossible to be entirely certain that specific activities do
not infringe on a patent.162 Doing so requires cutting through so-called
“patent thickets,”163 often involving a freedom-to-operate search that in
most contexts is too complex and expensive to be practical.164 Any
project must therefore bear the risk that it infringes one or more patents.
The uncertainty around possible infringement is thought to discourage
potential innovators from some investigations.165
Some of the doctrines discussed above eliminate this uncertainty by
exempting downstream research from infringement on any patent.
Other doctrines apply only to one specific patent, thereby leaving the
researcher at risk of liability based on infringement of other patents. Yet
others apply to many, but not all, patents, leaving some minimal risk of
infringement.
For instance, the section 271(e)(1) research exemption provides that
projects covered by the statute will not infringe any patent. There is no
risk of patent infringement for this research. Similarly, the doctrine of
constructive reduction to practice allows researchers to get patents
162

Janet Freilich, Patent Shopping, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 619, 630-31 (2020).
Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (2001) (“[O]ur patent
system is creating a patent thicket: an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that
those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple
patentees.”).
164 Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 289, 317 (2012).
165 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 70, at 698.
163
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based on mere hypotheses, and because “thinking” is not an act of
patent infringement, the act of constructive reduction to practice will
never infringe any patent.166
By contrast, the first-sale doctrine removes liability for use of a
patented product bought in an authorized sale, but only as to the
particular patentee who authorized the sale.167 The product might be
covered by patents owned by other parties, and the doctrine does
nothing to protect researchers from liability for infringement of those
patents. Similarly, private pledges relate to one particular patent or to a
group of specific patents.168 Downstream researchers may still run afoul
of patents not included in the pledge.
Other doctrines fall between these extremes, protecting from many,
but not all, patents. For example, the limited geographic scope of
patents means that a researcher in Argentina will not be liable for
infringing a U.S. patent — however, some U.S. patentees file the same
patent in Argentina (and even if not, the Argentinian research may
infringe some separate Argentinian patent) — therefore a researcher in
Argentina cannot be sure that she is protected from liability for patent
infringement.169 Low-cost downstream research is likewise protected
from many, but not all, patent suits.170 If a project infringes five patents,
it will often be low-cost with respect to each of those five patents (a
small research project will, for example, not produce extensive damages
for any infringed patent).171 But the project is not entirely immune. It is
possible that one of the patentees will have an idiosyncratic motivation
to sue — reputation-related, for instance — and so even small projects
are still subject to some risk of infringement liability.
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See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.A.1.
168 See supra Part II.C.2.
169 However, many countries have a research exemption that does, in many cases,
exempt researchers in those countries from infringement altogether. For a discussion
of the research exception worldwide, see generally supra note 127.
170 See supra Part II.C.1.
171 See id.
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Table 2: Doctrines that Exempt from Uncertainty
Size of shift in incentives
Smaller

Exempt from one
patent

Larger
Doctrines that. . .
Exempt from some
patents

Exempt from all
patents

First-sale exception

Geographic

35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1)

Private pledges

Low-cost research

Sovereign immunity
Constructive
reduction to practice
Secret research

Researchers will be most incentivized to conduct downstream
research when they are entirely protected from the risk of patent
infringement. Conversely, if protection only extends to one patent, it
may not greatly affect researchers’ behavior, particularly in situations
where downstream research is covered by many patents. Thus,
doctrines that provide cover for all patent-related uncertainty will be
particularly impactful as they provide a super-charged incentive for
downstream research. It is therefore especially important that these
doctrines be directed towards situations where downstream research is
desirable.
2.

Doctrines Affecting Projects and Institutions

Some paths around patent infringement are targeted at specific
research projects and others are specific institutions. This means that
some research projects can be transferred to another researcher or can
bring in a collaborator from a different institution and remain exempt
from infringement.172 Other research projects may lose their exempt
status if they do so.173

172 For instance, those exempt from infringement under the first-sale doctrine. Supra
Part II.A.1.
173 For instance, those exempt from infringement under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Supra Part II.A.3.
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For example, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a scientist at
a state university could conduct a research project without concern for
patent infringement. However, if that scientist got hired by a private
university, he would have to get a license from the patentee before
continuing with the project (or abandon the project, if licensing proved
too difficult).174 Similarly, the state university scientist might not be able
to collaborate with scientists at a private company, even if such a
collaboration would be beneficial to advancing the research.175
Analogously, a U.S. company purchasing rights to a research project
begun abroad would not be able to bring that project home without
worrying about a license.176
By contrast, if the doctrine runs with the research, rather than the
researcher, moving the research project is not a concern from the
standpoint of patent infringement. If research is conducted under the
first-sale exception, that research could be transferred to another
institution and continued without disrupting the exception.
Some doctrines are combinations. Low-cost research, in particular,
can be ignored by patentees for reasons relating to the research (for
example, one with minimal infringement) or for reasons relating to the
researcher (research by universities may be less concerning to patentees
than research by competitors). Low-cost research can become high-cost
with respect to either the project or the institution — projects with
minimal infringement can grow; university research can be licensed to
competitors.
This second level shift in incentives favors activities subject to
doctrines that run with the research, rather than the researcher, because
there are more avenues for collaboration.177 This raises important
questions about the goal of research exceptions. Is the purpose of
exceptions to invest resources in certain projects or is it to invest
resources in certain types of institutions? This division mirrors a debate
in the literature on grants — another method of supporting
innovation178 — about whether grants should fund individuals directly
(such as a MacArthur Foundation Genius Grant or Howard Hughes
174

See supra Part II.A.3.
Id.
176 See supra Part II.B.1.
177 This assumes, of course, that the collaborator could not easily get a license from
the upstream patentee.
178 See Pierre Azoulay, Danielle Li, Joshua S. Graff Zivin & Bhaven N. Sampat, Public
R&D Investment and Private-sector Patenting: Evidence from NIH Funding Rules, 86 REV.
ECON. STUD. 117, 117 (2019); see also Daniel Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond
the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 320 (2013).
175
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grant) or whether grants should be targeted towards specific projects.179
Both approaches can be useful, but create different incentives. Scholars
contrasting patents with other types of innovation incentives such as
grants and taxes have argued that a point of contrast between patents
and these other incentives is that patent are unable to target particular
individuals or institutions — but doctrines shifting incentives for
downstream research may provide a mechanism for patents to do just
that.180
The most desirable configuration for doctrines affecting downstream
research is an empirical question beyond the scope of this paper.
However, it is a question that should be addressed to the extent that
doctrines are created deliberately — in the current haphazard and often
accidental environment for these doctrines, there has been little deep
analysis about whether the doctrines should attach to projects or to
institutions.
Table 3: Doctrines that run with research projects; doctrines that run
with research institutions
Attach to projects
First-sale exception
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)

Doctrines that…
Are a combination
Low-cost research

Attach to
institutions
Sovereign
immunity
Geographic

Constructive reduction
to practice
Secret research
Private pledges

179 W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 50-54 (2019); Pierre
Azoulay, Joshua S. Graff Zivin & Gustavo Manso, Incentives and Creativity: Evidence
from the Academic Life Sciences, 42 RAND J. ECON. 527, 527-54 (2011) (studying
differences between outcomes of grants that fund institutions and those that fund
projects); W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 50-54 (2019).
180 Price, supra note 179, at 50.
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Lifecycle Doctrines

As downstream research moves from start to finish, it may also move
in and out of various doctrines. This temporal cycling diminishes the
impact of certain doctrines because they will be useful for only part of
the research project. Take, for example, a life sciences research project
that begins by seeking to understand the function of a certain cellular
pathway, but does not have an application in mind at that point. At the
conception stage, when the research team is simply brainstorming the
idea and setting out plans for lab protocols, the project would not be
infringement because thinking about an idea is not infringement. Once
the team began the physical steps of research, the project would be
patent infringement if it falls within the scope of an upstream patent.181
As the project develops, the team might discover a clinical endpoint and
begin to think about how the research could contribute to developing a
treatment for some disease. At this point, the project would cease to be
patent infringement because it would fall into section 271(e)(1).
It makes little sense for a project to cycle in and out of infringement.
It minimizes the utility of the doctrine(s) that do apply — in the
example above, there is no point in having an exception to patent
infringement to allow late-stage research if the early-stage research that
is a necessary predicate for the late-stage research cannot be done.182
Thus, the incentives created by partial-lifecycle doctrine will be weaker
than their counterparts that apply across the lifecycle of a project.
Some doctrines will protect a project throughout its development. For
example, research done outside the United States will never infringe on
a United States patent no matter how the research develops.183 Similarly,
many private patentees have pledged that they will not enforce their
patents downstream, including once a research project reaches
commercialization.184 Likewise, the first-sale exception has no
restrictions, so it protects a research project from the very earliest stages
when the researcher buys a commercially available product through to
181 While some early-stage research might be covered by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), other
early-stage research will not be. The precise contours of the doctrine with respect to
early-stage research are not clear, but the Supreme Court has noted that some earlystage research (specifically “[b]asic scientific research on a particular compound,
performed without the intent to develop a particular drug . . . “) is “surely not” within
the exception. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 205-06 (2005).
182 In practice, this early-stage research might be done by academic researchers, even
though it infringes, because patentees will often not sue academic researchers. The
results might then be used to develop a clinical product.
183 Assuming importation into the U.S. is not a research stage.
184 Though some private pledges apply only to academic research.
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the end of stages of the product, including, under some circumstances,
commercialization.185
Other doctrines are more of a middle ground, protecting all stages of
certain projects but only portions of others. Some secret research, for
example, can only remain secret at early stage, and must be publicized
as it develops, at which point it loses protection from infringement.186
Other secret research can stay secret forever, even after
commercialization.187 This type of secret research will never be subject
to infringement liability. Similarly, the end goal for some academic
research is publication, in which case the research is protected by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity from start to finish. Other academic
research is ultimately licensed to private companies for further
development, at which point sovereign immunity would cease to apply.
Table 4: Doctrines and Life-Cycle Changes
Size of shift in incentive
Smaller

Larger

Are stage-dependent
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
Constructive reduction
to practice

Doctrines that. . .
Are a combination
Low-cost research

Last forever
Private pledges

Sovereign immunity

Geographic

Secret research

First-sale exception

Generally, doctrines that protect projects over their lifetime will
create more impactful incentives, particularly if they include protection
for commercial sales.
E. Upstream Shifts in Incentives
This Article has enumerated shifts in incentives to downstream
research caused by various patent doctrines. Each incentive for
185 Some companies are in the business of buying a commercially available patented
product, changing it in some way, and re-selling it. This is protected under the first-sale
exception. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008).
186 For instance, early-stage drug development is often confidential, but later-stage
clinical trials in humans must be publicly disclosed. 42 C.F.R. § 11.2 (2021).
187 An internal process used to produce some commercial product, for example.
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downstream research, however, creates a corresponding incentive for
upstream research. If downstream researchers are not liable for acts that
would otherwise infringe patents, the value of the upstream patent is
diminished.188 Where doctrines increase downstream incentives to
innovate, they may commensurately decrease upstream incentives to
innovate.189 This Article will not delve deeply into the impact of
upstream incentives except to recognize their existence and note that
any change to incentives for downstream research must consider its
upstream counterpart.
III. EXPANDING THE MODEL: IMPLICATIONS, AND POLICY
A. Implications
1.

Accidental Incentives

At its core, the problem with doctrines that shift incentives for
downstream research is that they provide the wrong motivations to
innovators. Downstream researchers must pay the patentee for the right
to conduct experiments in areas covered by the patent and must also
grapple with transaction costs including interpreting the patent,190
finding the patentee,191 and negotiating a license. Some types of
downstream projects can be completely blocked by the patentee.192
These costs all serve as a tax on downstream innovation.
But there are certain areas of downstream research not subject to this
tax — areas where infringement liability does not apply for one reason
or another. It is less costly to conduct research in these areas, both in
pure dollar terms (because the upstream patentee need not be paid193)
188 Unless the upstream patentee desires more research on applications for their
invention, in which case it might increase the value of the upstream patent.
189 This has been discussed extensively in the literature on research tool patents.
Eisenberg, supra note 68, at 698; Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution
to the Problem Arising from Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA HIGH
TECH. L.J. 347, 362 (2004); Mueller, supra note 69, at 33-37; Strandburg, supra note 68,
at 131.
190 JAMES E. BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 53 (2008).
191 This is often surprisingly difficult. See Nathan P. Anderson, Striking a Balance:
The Pursuit of Transparent Patent Ownership, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 395, 396 (2015).
192 Simon, supra note 17, at 1299.
193 In the context of the first-sale exception, the patentee is still paid — through
purchase of a commercially available product. However, the patentee cannot block the
downstream research and therefore has no leverage to charge inflated prices for a
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and because the uncertainty of facing patent rights is alleviated.
Avoiding upstream patent rights is a great advantage to researchers in
these exempt areas — perhaps enough of an advantage to incentivize
downstream research in exempt areas and commensurately
disincentivize downstream research in areas still subject to patent
infringement.
Exemptions from patent infringement can therefore direct the
progress of downstream research. This is a powerful tool. But under
current law it is not used intentionally. Almost every shift catalogued
above is accidental.194 Most doctrines were created by laws that were
not intended to affect downstream research. For instance, the first-sale
doctrine, which shifts incentives for downstream research towards
investigations of new methods of use and away from new methods of
making, originates from a Supreme Court decision about the limits of
property rights195 and concerns about servitudes running with personal
property.196 The case first articulating the doctrine, Bloomer v.
McQuewan, does not discuss the doctrine’s impact on downstream
research — the effect of downstream research was probably not under
consideration in any way.197 Yet the first-sale doctrine may indeed affect
the path of downstream research. Because this impact is accidental, it is
also quite arbitrary: there is no particular reason to favor research on
methods of use over methods of making, as the doctrine does.
Even doctrines specifically intended to exempt certain areas of
downstream research from patent infringement have accidental
impacts. The statutory research exception, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e), was
deliberately enacted to allow generic companies to conduct research on
patented drugs before the patent expired.198 However, it is not clear that
downstream license, as might happen for products that do not fall into the first-sale
exception.
194 This is not the only way in which incentives for innovation are accidental. For a
different type of accidental innovation incentive involving healthcare policy choices, see
Rachel E. Sachs, The Accidental Innovation Policymakers, (forthcoming) (on file with
author).
195 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) (“[W]hen the
machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the
monopoly . . . . The implement or machine becomes [the buyer’s] private, individual
property, not protected by the laws of the United States.”).
196 Keeler v. Standard Folding-Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 667 (1895) (“The
inconvenience and annoyance to the public [of restrictions attached to the sale of
patented goods] are too obvious to require illustration.”); Andrew T. Dufresne, The
Exhaustion Doctrine Revived? Assessing the Scope and Possible Effects of the Supreme
Court’s Quanta Decision, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 11, 14-15 (2009).
197 Bloomer, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539.
198 Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 98, at 604-06.
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the statutory provision was originally intended to apply to any life
sciences research that supports regulatory approval, which is how the
standard is currently interpreted.199 And the statute was almost certainly
not intended to punish researchers conducting basic life sciences
experiments directed towards general knowledge, but not a specific
application subject to regulatory approval. Yet the statute’s effect is to
tax this basic research while discounting the price of applied research.
Other shifts in incentives for downstream research are deliberate in
the sense that they are a known and understood effect of creating a
patent law, but accidental in the sense that the shift was not a desired
outcome of the law. This applies to the geographic scope of patent law,
for example. If a U.S. patent exists, downstream research conducted in
the U.S. will infringe, while research conducted outside the U.S. will
not. It is no accident that patent infringement follows sovereign borders,
and the opportunities for arbitrage have long been understood.200 But it
is still important to recognize that researchers in different countries are
subject to different rules with respect to patent infringement.
2.

Compounding Incentives

The doctrines described above apply not only to downstream
research, but also to how downstream patents are allocated. As
explained below, these doctrines favor research by certain entities, who
can then get their own patents and use them to perpetuate shifts in
incentives. In other words, shifts in incentives compound.
Take, for example, a patent on a widget. A state university researcher
and a private university researcher are both interested in improving the
patented widget. The state university researcher goes ahead with her
researcher without considering the upstream patent because she is
immune from infringement.201 The private university researcher
attempts to negotiate a license with the patentee. The patentee agrees to
the license, but the negotiations take three months and the researcher
must then apply for a grant to cover the cost of the license, further
delaying the research. Just as the private university researcher begins
his project, the state university researcher — who has gotten a head
start on her work — succeeds in making a second-generation widget
and files for a patent on her invention. The private university researcher
thinks his improvement is better than the one patented by the state
university researcher, but also realizes that it falls into the scope of her
199
200
201

See supra Part II.A.2.a.
Samuelson, supra note 69, at 223-26.
See supra Part II.A.3.a.
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patent. He therefore needs to negotiate a license with her before he can
proceed.
The generalizable point is that research projects that are not subject
to infringement have an advantage in getting the second generation of
intellectual property rights. This amplifies the effect of the doctrine
exempting them from infringement because research projects that are
on the wrong side of the doctrine must now address two patents. It also
lengthens the doctrine’s effect because the effect does not end with the
first patent’s term but instead effectively extends to the end of the
second patent’s term.
The scenario with the researchers above may not happen often in
practice because university researchers are rarely sued for patent
infringement.202 But it can and does occur with shifts in incentives for
downstream research arising from the doctrine of constructive
reduction to practice. Downstream researchers who merely think about
an improvement to an upstream invention do not infringe an upstream
patent, whereas downstream researchers who physically create an
improved invention do infringe upstream patents.203 However, untested
hypotheses are enough to support a downstream patent.204 This means
that downstream researchers who think hard about potential
applications of an upstream technology can get a series of patents on
those applications and then block other downstream researchers who
want to test their own ideas for improvements.
For example, Nathan Myhrvold, the founder of Intellectual Ventures,
one of the largest patent assertion entities (“PAE”, known pejoratively
as a patent troll) is in the business of getting patents and asserting them
when they are infringed.205 Myhrvold is listed as an inventor on many
patents that claim inventions that have not been physically created —
but rather have been constructively reduced to practice.206 Myhrvold
202 E.g., John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the
Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021, 1021 (2003) (“[I]ndustrial [patentees] agreed that
the small prospective gains from a lawsuit were not worth the legal fees, the risk of the
patented being narrowed or invalidated, and the bad publicity from suing a
university.”).
203 See supra Part II.B.2.a.
204 Freilich, supra note 140, at 672-74.
205 Nathan Myhrvold, The Big Idea: Funding Eureka!, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 2010),
https://hbr.org/2010/03/the-big-idea-funding-eureka [https://perma.cc/Z8XZ-HD7K].
206 For example, the experiments in the following patents are labeled as “prophetic,”
meaning that they are hypothetical, not physical, experiments. U.S. Patent No.
8,724,251 (granted May 13, 2014); U.S. Patent No. 8,167,871 (granted May 1, 2012);
U.S. Patent No. 8,815,163 (granted Aug. 26, 2014); U.S. Patent No. 10,311,293 (granted
June 4, 2019); U.S. Patent No. 9,286,615 (granted March 15, 2016); U.S. Patent No.
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himself need not fear suit for patent infringement because he has not
actually used any of the inventions his patents build on — his
experiments are only hypothetical. But he is able to construct his own
patent portfolio and assert it against others who fall on the other side of
the downstream research incentive.
This asymmetry, where some entities are able to obtain patents
without infringement but other entities working in the same field do
infringe, is a dynamic that will be familiar to scholars of PAEs.207
Traditionally, companies held patents to protect their own products and
to assert against competitors.208 These competitors might infringe
patents, but the owners of the infringed patents might infringe patents
themselves.209 Reciprocal threats of infringement prevented suits. PAEs
destabilized this dynamic because they do not produce their own
products but are instead solely in the business of asserting patents.210
This means that they are generally not infringing on patents themselves,
and need not worry about a countersuit.211 A similar asymmetry is
created by doctrines affecting incentives for downstream research: some
entities can obtain their own patents but need not fear infringing others’
patents.
3.

Patent Law Is Unitary, Not Bifurcated

Studying shifts in incentives for downstream innovation reveals a
larger problem in patent policy and scholarship. Policy and scholarship
are bifurcated into two separate areas of focus. One area addresses how
patent law affects research — for example, discussions of how broad
patents affect research or analysis of whether the demise of the research
exemption would affect downstream research.212 The second area of
8,721,618 (granted May 13, 2014); U.S. Patent Application No. 20160245880 (filed
Feb. 2, 2015); U.S. Patent Application No. 20130046235 (filed Aug. 16, 2011).
207 See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2129 (2015); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner,
Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2005).
208 Freilich, supra note 162, at 625-26.
209 John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey,
Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 469 (2004); Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids,
Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-tech Patents, 87 N.C.
L. REV. 1571, 1582 (2009) (“If you build up your patent portfolio, I build up mine—
nukes pointing at each other . . . . That has exactly the right outcome. We sit here and
exchange patents with each other.” (quoting a Sun Microsystems executive)).
210 Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 Hastings L.J. 297, 300 (2010).
211 Id.
212 See supra notes 65–69 (discussing how patent law affects downstream research).
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focus addresses how patent law affects product availability and prices
— for example, how patents impact access to affordable medicines or
the impact of patent law on standard setting organizations.213 Each area
of focus has produced plentiful policy proposals. However, these policy
proposals are typically analyzed only in terms of how they will affect
the particular area of focus: research or sales, but not both.214
Assessment of the effects of patent policy is therefore segregated by area
of focus.
Policy analysis is split, but patent law is unitary. A law passed to
address product availability will also address research. Holes carved into
the patent right are available for sales and research alike. In
consequence, a policy targeted at sales will also impact research. The
first-sale exception, for example, is typically discussed in the context of
its effect on sales.215 But it also has an effect on research.216
Similarly, patches that apply only to sales will leave problems
remaining for research. For example, patents on methods or processes
can be circumvented by conducting the method outside of the United
States and importing the finished product into the United States.217 To
resolve this problem, Congress passed 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), which made
it an act of infringement to import into the United States “a product

213 E.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-pool Approach to Standardsbased Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 48 (2013); Cynthia M. Ho, Global Access
to Medicine: The Influence of Competing Patent Perspectives, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 78
(2016); A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND
Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110, 2111 (2018); David W. Opderbeck,
Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game, 58 VAND. L. REV. 501, 502 (2005);
F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry and World Intellectual Property Standards, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2247 (2000).
214 See supra notes 74–83, 213 (discussion the implications of patent law on
downstream research and how they affect sales.).
215 E.g., Impression Prods. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1525 (2017)
(discussing whether a seller of toner cartridges can restrict buyers’ ability to resell the
cartridge); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 624 (2008) (deciding
whether a seller could prevent a buyer from combining the sold products with others
and reselling).
216 See supra Part II.A.1.
217 For example, a patent claiming “a method of making widgets by combining part
A and part B” would not be infringed if a third party shipped parts A and B to a
manufacturer in Nepal who then combined the parts (an action which would be
infringing if it occurred in the United States) and sent the product back to the United
States. E.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 519 (1972)
(Company A held two combination patents for machinery used for deveining shrimp.
Company B, which was enjoined from making or selling the deveining machines
throughout the United States, sought actions to sell the parts outside of the U.S.).
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which is made by a process patented in United States.”218 This prevents
sales in the United States of a product made abroad by a process
patented in the United States.219 However, 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) does not
solve the same loophole for research. There is no prohibition on
conducting research abroad using a technique patented in the United
States and then importing the results of that research back into the
United States. In Bayer v. Housey, Housey owned U.S. patents on a
method of screening for substances that might be useful as drugs.220
Bayer used Housey’s method outside of the United States to discover
certain compounds with potential as pharmaceutical treatments.221
Bayer then imported those products into the United States.222 The
Federal Circuit held that section 271(g) did not apply — that Bayer had
not infringed Housey’s patents — because the patented process had
been used to generate information, not to manufacture a product.223 The
loophole patched by section 271(g) was therefore closed only with
respect to sales, but not with respect to research.
The effect of bifurcated thinking about patent policy creates blind
spots for scholars. It is obvious that a change to a research exception
(such as the Federal Circuit’s decision in Madey224 to essentially
eliminate the general research exception) will affect research — and
there is much scholarship to that effect.225 But it is less obvious that
218 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2018) (“Whoever without authority imports into the United
States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made
by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the
importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such
process patent.”).
219 The House report explained that the rationale for the new law was to fix the
problem that allowing sales of imported products created according to patented
processes “ignores the reality that the offending act is the importation of a product made
through the use of a protected patent or its subsequent sale within the United States.”
H.R. REP. NO. 99-807, at 2 (1986).
220 Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
221 Id. at 1370.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
225 The Federal Circuit’s decision in Madey was criticized on these grounds. See
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCI. 1018, 1018 (2003) (“[The
Madey decision was] an alarming wake-up call to the academic community.”); David
Malakoff, Academia Gets No Help from U.S. in Patent Case, 300 SCI. 1635, 1635 (2003)
(“[T]he case stunned many university administrators, who predict that it will slow
academic research and increase costs.”); Jennifer Miller, Sealing the Coffin on the
Experimental Use Exception, 2 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 6 (2003) (“[R]esearch
institutions . . . will be at the mercy of patent holders.”); Janice M. Mueller, The
Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability:
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when a research exception is taken away (as in Madey), a number of
doctrines intended to affect sales would then affect research, as research
was no longer exempted from patent infringement.
4.

Crystalizing the Impact of Patents on Downstream Research

As noted above, there is an extensive literature on downstream
research, but it makes certain simplifying assumptions about the
relationship between upstream and downstream innovation. This
Article adds complexity to our understanding of upstream patents and
downstream research and thereby helps clarify various arguments in the
existing literature.
First, much writing begins with the premise that patents block
downstream research.226 This Article demonstrates that while patents
may indeed hamper downstream research, they do not block it
completely — patents shift downstream research by blocking some
forms of downstream research but not others. Second, another stream
of literature on downstream innovation notes that downstream
innovation exists but does not provide a mechanism for how it happens
even when an upstream patent is present.227 This Article emphasizes
that while some downstream innovation may happen after licensing or
infringement, there is a third path: downstream innovation can happen
quite permissibly without a license as long as it follows one of the paths
that avoids infringement.
However, while exceptions permit downstream innovation along
certain paths, upstream patents can still dampen incentives for
downstream innovation, even in areas covered by exceptions. The
Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV.
917, 920 (2004) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s unfriendliness towards the research
exemption will cause research “to be shifted offshore to legally hospitable forums”);
David G. Sewell, Rescuing Science from the Courts: An Appeal for Amending the Patent
Code to Protect Academic Research in the Wake of Madey v. Duke University, 93 GEO. L.J.
759, 759 (2005) (“[T]he legal edifice on which modern academic research is based
began to crumble.”); Cristina Weschler, The Informal Experimental Use Exception:
University Research After Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536, 1537
(2004) (“[It will be] difficult, if not impossible, for university researchers to rely on [the
experimental use defense] in patent infringement suits.”); Brief for Ass’n of American
Medical Colleges et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14, Duke Univ. v.
Madey, 123 S. Ct. 2639 (2003) (No. 02-1007) (expressing “grave concerns” that
narrowing the research exception would “encourage patent holders to assert claims in
a manner that will altogether frustrate university scientists’ ability to make further basic
advances in critical areas of biotechnology and biomedicine”).
226 See supra Part I.B.1.
227 See supra Part I.B.2.
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doctrines discussed in this Article apply to research. They do not apply
to sales. Someone other than the upstream patentee can conduct
research and develop an improved technology without infringement.
But this entity cannot sell the fruit of their research without the
patentee’s permission.228 This constraint on later sales might reduce
incentives for earlier research, although the incentives created by
blocking downstream sales will affect research at for-profit companies
much more than research at non-profit entities.229
a.

Reinterpreting Empirical Studies

More precisely explaining incentives for downstream innovation is
important because it allows improved interpretation of empirical
studies of the downstream effects of patents.230 This is in turn important
because these empirical studies are deeply influential that have played
a vital role in policy debates.231 Yet their use in policy debates results
from imprecise interpretation of the studies.232

228 Sales are generally infringement. Some of the exceptions listed above do apply to
sales in certain ways — for example, a foreign company could research and sell a
downstream innovation abroad, but could not sell it in the US. Similarly, an innovator
could buy a patented item and incorporate that item into another product and then sell
that product — this innovator would be protected under the first sale doctrine. See
Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc. 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008).
229 Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 903 F.3d 1310, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“The existence of such a blocking patent may deter non-owners and nonlicensees from investing the resources needed to make, develop, and market such a later,
‘blocked’ invention, because of the risk of infringement liability.”).
230 See Jonathan H. Ashtor, Does Patented Information Promote the Progress of
Technology?, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 943, 948 (2018); Alberto Galasso & Mark
Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the Courts, 130
Q.J. ECON. 317, 317 (2014); Kenneth G. Huang & Fiona E. Murray, Does Patent Strategy
Shape the Long-Run Supply of Public Knowledge? Evidence from Human Genetics, 52 ACAD.
MANAGEMENT J. 1193, 1196 (2009); Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual
Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the
Anti-Commons Hypothesis, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 648, 648 (2007); Sampat &
Williams, supra note 73, at 203; Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and
Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome, 121 J. POL. ECON. 1, 1 (2013).
231 For instance, Bhaven Sampat’s and Heidi L. Williams’ article, How Do Patents Affect
Follow-on Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome, Sampat & Williams, supra note 73,
was cited in recent hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Subcommittee Hearing
on “The State of Patent Eligibility in America, Part II”, 116th Cong. (2019) (testimony of Hans
Sauer, Ph.D., Deputy General Counsel and Vice President for Intellectual Property,
Biotechnology Innovation Organization (“BIO”)), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Sauer%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/38MG-QATL].
232 See Janet Freilich & Sepehr Shahshahani, Measuring Follow-on Innovation (draft
on file with author).
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The general challenge with these empirical studies is that they
attempt to measure how much innovation occurs in an area covered by
a patent and compare that to innovation in comparable scenarios not
covered by the patent. But many studies assume that downstream
innovation covered by an existing patent always constitutes patent
infringement. That is not entirely accurate. Patents shift incentives
innovation in a field, allowing some activities but not others. Some
measures of downstream innovation in these studies are therefore not
actually patent infringement. The studies still provide valuable
information about the impact of patents on downstream innovation, but
the interpretation of the results should be somewhat different.
b.

Guiding Patent Doctrine

Understanding precisely how and when downstream research occurs
also informs an important question of patent doctrine. The Federal
Circuit is split on (and the Supreme Court has so far declined to
resolve233) the question of how the presence of an upstream patent
impacts evidence on the obviousness of a downstream invention.234
Courts are often asked to determine whether a patented invention is
obvious, and, in consequence, whether the patent should be
invalidated.235 This inquiry is challenging because it occurs many years
after the invention was first conceived, and what looks obvious in
hindsight may not have been obvious at all years earlier.236
To reduce the risk of hindsight bias, courts employ “objective indicia
of non-obviousness” (also called “secondary considerations of nonobviousness”237).238 These are, as the name suggests, objective

233 Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 742 F. App’x 511 at *1 (Fed. Cir. 2018),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2674 (2019); Acorda, 903 F.3d at 1342, cert denied, 140 S. Ct.
111 (2019); Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 972 (2005).
234 Compare Galderma Lab’ys., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 740 (2013)
(holding that certain objective indicia of nonobviousness are not relevant in the
presence of a blocking patent), with Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc., 874
F.3d 724, 730 (2017) (holding that objective indicia “should not [be] discounted”
because of a blocking patent because such a patent does not block all downstream
research and development).
235 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2018).
236 Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1393 (2006).
237 See generally Dmitry Karshtedt, Nonobviousness: Before and After, 106 IOWA L.
REV. 1609, 1638 (2021) (discussing the alternate terminology).
238 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
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indicators that an invention was not obvious at the time it was made.239
For example, if there was a long-felt need for an invention, but nobody
had made it, the inference is that creating the invention was no obvious
task.240 If others tried to create the invention but failed to so, the
invention is probably not obvious.241 Similarly, if the invention was a
commercial success, it is less likely to be obvious, since others would
presumably have taken the opportunity to succeed commercially if it
were obvious to do so.242
However, objective indicia of non-obviousness play out quite
differently in the presence of an upstream patent. For example, imagine
that company A owns a patent on widgets and company B licenses the
patent and makes a certain widget improvement. The widget
improvement is a wild success — lauded by industry experts as the
solution to a long-standing problem and sold to millions of consumers.
But is this success evidence that the invention was not obvious? Perhaps
not. If company A declined to license its patent to anyone other than
company B, others could not have solved the long-standing problem,
even if the solution was obvious. Similarly, others could not have
experienced commercial success. And finally, others may have tried and
failed to make the widget improvement not because it was nonobvious
but because they were trying to design around company A’s patent.
Thus, the presence of an upstream patent may complicate interpretation
of objective indicia of nonobviousness.
In recent years, the Federal Circuit has decided a series of cases that
find that, a blocking patent “can discount the significance” of objective
indicia of nonobviousness.243 This has the effect of making it easier for
a challenger to argue that a patent is obvious, because the objective
239

See id.
E.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279 (1944)
(“During a period of half a century, in which the use of flashlight batteries increased
enormously, and the manufacturers of flash light cells were conscious of the defects in
them, no one devised a method of curing such defects.”).
241 E.g., Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 381 (1909) (“It may be safely
said that if those skilled in the mechanical arts are working in a given field, and have
failed, after repeated efforts, to discover a certain new and useful improvement, that he
who first makes the discovery has done more than make the obvious . . . .”).
242 Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. 395 F.3d 1364, 1376 (2005) (“[T]he
law presumes an idea would successfully have been brought to market sooner, in
response to market forces, had the idea been obvious to persons skilled in the art.”).
243 Id. at 1377; Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Lab’ys., Inc., 903 F.3d 1310,
1339 (2018); Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc., 874 F.3d 724, 730-31
(2017); Galderman Lab’ys., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 741 (2013); Allergan,
Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 15-cv-1455, 2017 WL 4803941, at *48 (E.D. Tex.
Oct. 16, 2017).
240
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indicia of nonobviousness tend to support the patentee’s contention of
validity. In several briefs to the Supreme Court in support of petitions
for certiorari, various parties argued that this was a substantial hit to the
patent incentive because, since almost all inventions build on previous
knowledge, many inventions occur in the shadow of a blocking patent
and thus would be affected by this doctrine.244
The parties all appear to agree that, if an upstream patent entirely
prevents others from working in a particular area, it would indeed be
relevant to the objective indicia of nonobviousness. However, there is
dispute about how much a particular upstream patent blocks the
downstream research in question. Does the upstream patent block all
downstream research so that competitors could not develop their own
solutions no matter how obvious?245 Or does the upstream patent allow
some downstream research — through, say, the 271(e)(1) exception or
by companies located oversees?246 If some downstream research is
permitted, how likely is it to allow the sorts of developments relevant
to the objective indicia inquiry?
This question comes up frequently,247 but there are vast
disagreements about when downstream research can occur in the
presence of an upstream blocking patent.248 These disagreements may
occur in part because there is no clear catalogue setting out when
downstream research can proceed and when it is blocked. This Article
provides such a catalogue. Because each case is intensely fact-specific,
understanding when downstream research is permitted does not
244 E.g., Brief of Biotechnology Innovation Org. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 7, Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Lab’ys., Inc., No. 18-1280 (Fed.
Cir. 2019); Brief of Boston Patent Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 11, Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Lab’ys., Inc., No. 18-1280 (Fed. Cir.
2019).
245 See Acorda, 903 F.3d at 1338 (“[One relevant question is] whether such
improvements will be entirely covered by the blocking patent.”).
246 See id. at 1338-39.
247 See, e.g., Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 15-cv-1455, 2017 WL
4803941, at *49 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017), aff’d, 742 Fed. App’x 511 (Fed. Cir. 2018);
Warner Chilcott Co., LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 37 F. Supp. 3d 731, 739 (D. Del.),
aff’d, 594 F. App’x 630 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Senju Pharm. Co. Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., 717 F.
Supp. 2d 404, 426 (D. Del. 2010), aff’d, 485 F. App’x 433 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Proctor &
Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 476, 496 (D. Del. 2008), aff’d,
566 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353,
392 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 550 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Aventis Pharma
Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin Ltd., No. 05CV421, 2006 WL 2008962, at *44 (E.D. Va.
July 17, 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 499 F.3d 1293 (2007).
248 As evidenced by the several petitions for certiorari. See petitions cited at supra
note 233.
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provide a blanket answer in each case, but it does provide a framework
from which to begin the discussion and a deeper understanding to
motivate a court’s conclusions.
5.

Incentive Shifts and Under-Enforcement

Some empirical work finds that university researchers by-and-large
ignore patents and that patentees are reluctant to sue academic
researchers for infringement.249 Scholars have suggested that even
outside of academia, many companies simply ignore the possibility of
patent infringement when making decisions.250 In this sort of climate,
do doctrines affecting incentives for downstream research still matter?
Yes. First, there is significant empirical evidence that patents do deter
downstream innovation.251 This suggests either that patentees are
enforcing their patents or that downstream researchers are preemptively
skirting areas covered by patents in an attempt to follow the rules and
avoid infringement.252 Second, though underenforcement might blunt
the effect of certain doctrines, the doctrines are still available and can
be used by patentees. By relying on underenforcement as a mechanism
to avoid the ill effects of accidental incentives for downstream
innovation, rather than a policy change to remove those incentives, the
power to exploit incentives for downstream innovation is shifted from
public control to private control.253
249 See Sampat & Williams, supra note 73, at 203 (finding that gene patents have no
effect on downstream research). Several studies have found that university researchers
simply ignore patents when conducting downstream research. See John P. Walsh,
Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on
Biomedical Innovations, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285 (Wesley M.
Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance,
Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1063-75 (2008); Zhen Lei, Rakhi Juneja & Brian D. Wright, Patents
Versus Patenting: Implications of Intellectual Property Protection for Biological Research,
27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 36, 37 (2009); John P. Walsh, Wesley M. Cohen & Charlene
Cho, Where Excludability Matters: Material Versus Intellectual Property in Academic
Biomedical Research, 36 RSCH. POL’Y 1184, 1191 (2007); John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora &
Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCI. 1021, 1021 (2003)
[hereinafter Patent Problem].
250 Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21.
251 E.g., Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 230, at 317; Murray & Stern, supra note
230, at 648 (finding that citations to knowledge covered by a patent declines by ten to
twenty percent after the patent is granted); Williams, supra note 230, at 2.
252 See supra Part II.C.b.
253 There are many examples of patentees choosing to enforce patents in situations
where the infringer expected their infringement to be ignored. For example, DuPont
use patents on its oncomouse technology to demand licenses from academic
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In addition, some researchers are sensitive to the possibility of
infringement liability, even if unlikely, and behave accordingly. This
fear was enhanced in the wake of the billion-dollar verdict in Monsanto
v. DuPont.254 After the DuPont verdict, a law firm advised its clients to
review the [section 271(e)(1)] exemption to ensure that their
research either falls within those bounds or to ensure that all
necessary licenses are in order. Simply because an infringing use
would not involve selling, offering to sell, or importing a
patented invention, it cannot be assumed that damages would
be minimal.255
Further, interviews with research scientists report that some use “going
offshore” as a strategy to avoid patent infringement — evidence that
patent law indeed shifts the course of downstream research.256
Another example of how patent doctrine plays a role in shaping
downstream research is the history of the section 271(e)(1)
exception.257 Patentees were systematically blocking generic drug
companies from conducting research, a situation that was so
problematic that Congress passed a bill to fix the situation.258 This is
evidence that even in an environment where patents are often
underenforced, there are pockets where downstream research is heavily
impacted by patent enforcement.
Finally, the argument that incentives for downstream innovation do
not matter because patents are under-enforced relies on patentees who
care about reputational costs and who do not file suits in low-damage

researchers, who were surprised and outraged to be subject to patent-related threats.
Fiona Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared: Hybrid Exchange Strategies as a Source of
Distinction at the Boundary of Overlapping Institutions, 116 AM. J. SOCIO. 341, 346 (2010).
The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation similarly created an outcry when it
attempted to control creation and distribution of embryonic stem cells. John M. Golden,
WARF’s Stem Cell Patents and Tensions Between Public and Private Sector Approaches to
Research, J.L. MED. & ETHICS 314, 314 (2010).
254 Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 748 F.3d 1189, 1192 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
255 Damages
for Research and Development, NUTTER (Sept. 18, 2012),
https://www.nutter.com/ip-law-bulletin/damages-for-research-and-development
[https://perma.cc/3GHJ-GRUA].
256 See Gregory Day & Steven Udick, Patent Law and the Emigration of Innovation, 94
WASH. L. REV. 119, 133 (2019); John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen,
Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021, 1021 (2003).
257 See supra Part II.A.2.a.
258 Id.
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cases.259 But patent assertion entities (patent trolls), who make up a
substantial percentage of plaintiffs in patent suits, are notoriously not
sensitive to reputational costs.260
These patentees are also not deterred by low-damage cases. In one
example a patentee sought $1,000 in damages from each alleged
infringer for their use of a scan-to-email technology.261 It is quite
plausible that a PAE will send (or perhaps has already sent) demand
letters to academic laboratories conducting downstream research on
patented technology. If this happens often enough, these academic labs
might shift to non-infringing research. In short, even in an environment
where most patents are not enforced and most researchers ignore
patents, incentives matter.
B. Policy
At present, doctrines that shift incentives for downstream research
are by-and-large unintended consequences of doctrines designed to
address some other legal problem. This creates some negative effects
and suggests that patent law may not be using these doctrines in an
optimal way. There are three basic options for reform: (1) eliminate all
exceptions to patent infringement; (2) target exceptions to create
desirable effects; or (3) implement a universal research exception. Each
is explored in turn. Although all approaches have some advantages, a
universal research exception is the best solution to the problem of
suboptimal incentives for downstream research.
1.

No Exceptions

If doctrines shifting incentives for downstream research create
predominantly negative effects, they could be minimized by removing
259 See Jacob H. Rooksby, When Tigers Bare Teeth: A Qualitative Study of University
Patent Enforcement, 46 AKRON L. REV. 171, 174 (2013).
260 Shawn P. Miller, Ashwin Aravind, Bethany Bengfort, Clarisse De La Cerda,
Matteo Dragoni, Kevin Gibson, Amit Itai, Charles Johnson, Deepa Kannappan, Emily
Kehoe, Hyosang Kim, Katherine Mladinich, Roberto Pinho, John Polansky & Brian
Weissenberg, Who’s Suing Us? Decoding Patent Plaintiffs Since 2000 with the Stanford
NPE Litigation Dataset, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 235, 254 (2018); Although PAEs are
generally discussed in the context of software, they also target other industries. Robin
Feldman & Nicholson Price W. II, Patent Trolling: Why Bio & Pharmaceuticals Are at
Risk, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 773, 773 (2014).
261 Joe Mullin, Meet the Nice-Guy Lawyers Who Want $1,000 per Worker for Using
Scanners, Ars Technica (Apr. 7, 2013), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/04/meetthe-nice-guy-lawyers-who-want-1000-per-worker-for-using-scanners/ [https://perma.cc/
2VMA-5DY6].
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all exceptions to patent infringement. For example, if there were no
first-use exception, downstream research would not be shifted towards
methods of using and away from methods of making patented products.
However, even if all exceptions were eliminated, some incentive shifts
would remain. Most notably, downstream innovation would be
channeled towards goals supported by the upstream patentee, who
would have absolute power to permit or deny downstream research.262
This would effectively substitute incentives created by public bodies
(Congress and courts) for incentives created by private bodies
(patentees). Further, the structure of patent law itself creates incentives
in a way that cannot be prevented, even if formal exceptions were
removed — for one, domestic law cannot control research in other
countries.263 Finally, because these incentives arise from doctrines
intended to affect other areas of law, eliminating the doctrines would
have substantial effects on those other areas.
The goal, therefore, should not be to remove incentives for certain
types of downstream research but rather to channel the research
towards socially desirable and productive outcomes.
2.

Targeted Exceptions

Current patterns of incentives for downstream research are generally
accidental. One implication of this Article is that exceptions to patent
infringement can be exploited to create desired incentives.
To some extent, the current system already has targeted incentives.
Section 271(e)(1), for example, was designed to speed access to generic
drugs, and there is an exception for medical procedures intended to
avoid reduced availability of such procedures.264 However, the status
quo could be improved in two ways. First, although some approaches
are targeted to particular goals, others are accidental — the effects of
these approaches would be more coherent if all were deliberately
targeted. Second, although some existing doctrines are directed at
particular goals, they do not consider what other goals might be
disincentivized by the doctrines. While it is surely desirable to
incentivize development of new medicines, is it in the public interest to
262 At least to the extent that they could enjoin research work (rather than receive
damages). See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); John M.
Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 506-07 (2010).
263 The U.S. Patent Act limits patent infringement to acts with some relationship to
the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018).
264 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2018); American Medical Association, Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues in the Patenting of Medical Procedures, 53 FOOD DRUG
L.J. 341, 341 (1998).
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incentivize such research over the basic science that underlies later
work towards new medicines? The impact of targeted incentives should
be analyzed reciprocally, considering both incentives and disincentives.
Targeted doctrines have several advantages over alternative policies.
One is that, by targeting specific activities and omitting others, they
reduce the penalty to upstream patent holders as compared to a broad
research exception. Any exception from patent infringement removes
some of the benefit that would otherwise accrue to the upstream
patentee. Such a patentee might charge $5 for a license to conduct
research on their widgets; if widget-research is exempt from patent
infringement, the patentee effectively loses $5 for each researcher.265
Shrinking the upstream patentee’s reward reduces some of the incentive
for that upstream innovation, and so should be done with caution.
Doctrines that target specific areas as exceptions to infringement take a
smaller bite out of the upstream patent than a broader exception.
Targeted downstream incentives therefore permit reciprocally targeted
upstream effects.
Additionally, targeted doctrines allow a more fine-grained division
between public and private control of downstream research. In the
absence of doctrines omitting any downstream research from patent
infringement, all downstream research is under private control. Private
patentees can choose to permit all research or restrict some research.
With a broad research exception, all downstream research is under
public control and patents play no role. Targeted doctrines permit
policy makers to assign some types of downstream research to private
control and others to public control, as appropriate for each type of
research.
Targeted doctrines would be better than the status quo because
incentives would be less haphazard and would be created with emphasis
on socially beneficial research paths. In practice, however, tailoring
would be difficult to manage. It is hard to foresee all consequences of
shifts to incentives for downstream research and challenging to agree
on what types of innovation are most desirable. Further, when the need
for downstream innovation arises unexpectedly and urgently, Congress
is not always able to act quickly to respond to an urgent need for
innovation.266
265 This is an overly simplistic analysis. It is possible than a research exception for
widgets would incentivize more downstream research on widgets, which would lead to
more sales of widget-containing devices, which in turn would generate licensing
revenue for the original patentee.
266 See Barton H. Thompson Jr., The Continuing Innovations of Citizen Enforcement,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV 185, 211 (2000).
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Broad Research Exception

The best way to avoid the negative effects of incentives that favor
certain types of downstream innovation over others is to enact a broad
research exception. This has been proposed many times by many
scholars.267 This Article, however, provides a new justification for the
policy. Traditionally the case for the research exception was founded on
the premise that downstream research will be blocked in the absence of
such an exception.268 However, as shown above, downstream research
is not blocked — it is shifted. Shifts can be just as harmful as blockages,
perhaps more, if they prevent research in areas that are desirable and
direct research towards paths that are harmful. Shifts in incentives for
downstream innovation reinforce the case for a broad research
exception because they reveal a new ill arising from the exception’s lack:
a systematic push towards certain types of downstream innovation and
away from others.
While a broad research exception is easy to articulate at a general level
— all research should be exempt from patent infringement — the devil
is, of course, in the details. In particular, it is important that a broad
research exception be limited to research on a patented technology, and
not extend to research with a patented technology.269 If research with a
particular technology is not patent infringement, then there is no
incentive to develop upstream technologies that are used solely as
research tools.270 Distinguishing research with a patented technology
from research on a patented technology adds some complexity to a
research exception, but it is still feasible. Many countries have a
research exception that incorporates this concept.271 Beyond the
research on/research with distinction, scholars have proposed a variety
of detailed schemes to implement a broad research exceptions.272 Any
of those schemes would work to prevent the ills described above.
267 E.g., Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science, supra note 68, at 458;
Eisenberg, supra note 249, at 1071; Strandburg, supra note 68, at 85.
268 See supra Part I.B.1.
269 See Strandburg, supra note 68, at 85.
270 This problem is extensively discussed in the literature. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff
& Christopher M. Holman, Recent Developments Affecting the Enforcement, Procurement,
and Licensing of Research Tool Patents, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1299, 1301 (2008)
(“[U]ses of patented research tools in almost all contexts, even for university-based
basic research, must for now be considered an actionable infringement of exclusive
patent rights.”).
271 See Jordan Paradise & Christopher Janson, Decoding the Research Exemption, 7
NATURE REVS. GENETICS 148, 148 (2006).
272 E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 249, at 1071; Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of
Science, supra note 68, at 458; Strandburg, supra note 68, at 85.
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In the context of shifting incentives for downstream research, the
biggest advantage of a broad research exception is its neutrality. Since
all research is allowed, there is no incentive for one over another. A
broad research exception even prevents incentives that arise from
inevitable structural constraints of patent law. For example,
international researchers would no longer have an advantage over
domestic researchers because domestic researchers are equally able to
conduct experiments. A broad research exception removes the ability of
individual patentees to incentivize research towards paths in their own
private interest.273 It does not favor research on methods of making over
research on methods of using, because both are equally permissible. It
avoids the worst distortions caused by the doctrine of constructive
reduction to practice by rendering it possible for researchers to conduct
experiments before seeking a patent, if they wish to do so. There is less
incentive to keep research results secret because disclosing results will
not subject the researcher to infringement liability.
A broad research exception is also one sure to apply to socially
beneficial projects, since it applies to all projects. It leaves no concerns
that certain types of research are incentivized over others. Legislators
need not worry that an unforeseen circumstance will create the need for
a particular category of research that is excluded from current
exceptions because the exception will cover all types of research.
I do not mean to minimize the challenges of implementing a broad
research exception. There will certainly be complexities and
ambiguities that must be resolved by courts — for one, what is research?
But the status quo is also complex and ambiguous. Determining if a
particular action infringes a patent is notoriously difficult.274 The
current system taxes innovators in some fields and some circumstances
with sorting through this morass of ambiguity while exempting others.
A broad research exception may allow researchers (who are usually not
patent attorneys) to avoid entangling themselves in patent law. This
analysis can be deferred until the research is ready to be sold, at which
point it may be supported by an infrastructure better able to deal with
legal complexities.

273 This of course can be viewed as a negative aspect of a broad research exception,
since one aspect of the patent right is the ability to block others’ use of the invention
for undesired purposes — and this is valuable to some patentees.
274 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46 (2008).

2022]

Paths to Downstream Innovation

2269

A final important benefit of a broad research exception is that it
removes minimal rights from patentees.275 Any exception to
infringement reduces the scope of the upstream patent somewhat, and
therefore diminishes its value. Policy proposals that change the breadth
of current research exceptions must account for an impact on upstream
innovators and avoid exceptions so broad that there is insufficient
incentive for upstream innovation. A broad research exception does
reduce licensing revenue for patentees, and does so more than a series
of narrow targeted exceptions. However, it maintains patentees’ right to
block downstream sales of any product arising from downstream
research, meaning that patentees retain the bulk of their patent’s
profitability.
There are, however, several situations where patent owners will feel
deprived of important rights by a research exception. Patent owners will
not be able to use their patents to block downstream research when the
research will reveal something damaging about the upstream
technology, allow a competitor to enter the market sooner after the
patent expires than would otherwise be possible, or facilitate a
competitor’s development of a more appealing version of the
technology. Reducing patent rights to prevent this blocking ability is a
real loss to the patentee, who may suffer from allowing this downstream
research.
However, the situations enumerated above are also areas where
society benefits significantly from the downstream research. It is
desirable to encourage research that reveals information about flaws in
patented technology and patentees should not be able to muzzle speech
about dangers to their product. Equally, patentees should not be able to
extend the effective term of their patent by preventing research by
competitors preparing to enter the market as soon as the patent expires.
Finally, it is important to incentivize development of improved versions
of technology, even if they do not originate from the patentee. In short,
the situations where the patentee will lose key rights from a broad
research exception are those where society benefits from downstream
research and therefore precisely where a research exemption is most
needed.
For all these reasons, a broad research exception is the best way to
remedy the ills of distorted incentives for downstream research.

275 As explained above, this assumes that the exception applies only to research on
a patented technology, not research with a patented technology.

2270

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:2209

CONCLUSION
Prior literature models the relationship between upstream and
downstream innovation as either one where the former entirely blocks
the latter, or one where downstream research is permitted, and
allocation of rights is negotiated ex post. This Article presents a new
model. Upstream patents provide a broad barrier to downstream
research that has been — generally accidentally over the course of many
years of doctrinal development — pierced in multiple places by
channels along which downstream research can flow. These channels
shelter downstream researchers from the costs and uncertainties of the
patent system, and thereby provide an enticing path for downstream
research. But the safety of these channels pulls downstream research
away from other paths that, while more fraught from the perspective of
the researcher, may ultimately have more social value.
In this way, such doctrines shift the course of downstream research
in ways that are unstructured and not oriented towards planned goals.
This outcome is not inevitable. A broad research exception would open
all paths to downstream research, avoiding harmful incentives and
further the Constitutional purpose of patent law, to “promote the
Progress of Science.”276

276

U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.

